No. 88-2026

Supreme Court, U.S.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1988

CLEMENT J. PACYNA, PETITIONER
MSG, U.S. Army, Retired

vs.

JOHN O. MARSH, JR., in his capacity as Secretary of the Army, Army Board for Correction of Military Records, and JOHN W. MATTHEWS, in his capacity as Executive Secretary of the Board

---

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER

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QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether res judicata may lie to bar retired serviceman's instant suit, supported by substantial evidence, where: (1) a fatal jurisdictional defect exists in the first action on a monetary claim, rendering the court's judgment invalid or not a required valid final judgment upon which the second court relied; (2) the government in both the first and second action moved to dismiss suit on ground the court lacked jurisdiction; (3) the decisions of the courts below violate statutory and constitutional due process provisions and are in conflict with at least two opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court and federal circuit courts; and (4) case law holds that where a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction at the outset of a law suit, all judgments or orders, including appellate decisions are a nullity?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Opinions below..... 1

Jurisdiction..... 1

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved..... 2

Preliminary Statement..... 3

POINT I - A SERIES OF JURISDICTIONAL DEFECTS EXISTS INFRINGING ON CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS.. 4

POINT II - JURISDICTIONAL DEFECTS WERE NEVER DETERMINED..... 4

POINT III - STATUTE CLEARLY VIOLATED..... 7

POINT IV - CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS VIOLATED..... 8

POINT V - DECISION OF THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT IS IN CONFLICT WITH PREVALENT CASE AUTHORITIES.... 8

POINT VI - LACK OF JURISDICTION RENDERS ALL JUDGMENTS OR ORDERS A NULLITY..... 11

POINT VII - THE GOVERNMENT'S ACTION IN DEALING WITH THE JURISDICTIONAL ISSUE BORDERS ON THE IRRESPONSIBLE..... 12

Statement..... 13

Argument..... 23

Conclusion..... 35

Page

Appendices:

Judgment/Order, Court of Appeals.... A
Judgment/Order, Rehearing denied.... B
Opinion, second district court..... C
Opinion, first district court..... D
Promotion denied, Rules violated.... E
ABCMR final denial, 20 Jul 1982..... F

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Adams v. Justices, 21 Georgia, 206... 10

Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967)..... 31

Aetna Life v. McCabe, 556 F. Supp. 1342..... 27

Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937)..... 31

Air Transport Assn v. PATCO, 516 F. Supp. 1108, Affirm 667 F.2d 316.... 11

Ashe v. McNamara, 355 F.2d 277 (CA 1st Cir., 1965)..... 30

Blevins v. Orr, 721 F.2d 1419 (D.C. Cir., 1983)..... 28

Brech v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 362 F.Supp. 914..... 10

Cerbone v. Westchester County, 508 F. Supp. 780..... 27

Dilley v. Alexander, 603 F.2d 914 (D.C. Cir., 1979)..... 28

Page

Dore v. Kleppe, 522 F.2d 1369 (CA 5th Cir., 1976).....26,28

Dunnhausen v. First Nat. Bank, 538 F. Supp. 551..... 27

Fitzsimmons v. Brooklyn, 102 N.Y. 536..... 10

Ganse v. United States, 180 Ct. Cl. 183, 376 F.2d 1354 (1974)..... 10

Hahn v. United States, 757 F.2d 581 (CA 3rd Cir., 1985)..... 30

Hamlin v. United States, 391 F.2d 941 (Ct. Cl., 1968)..... 30

Hardison v. Alexander, 655 F.2d 1281 (D.C. Cir., 1981)..... 28

Hurick v. Lehman, 782 F.2d 986..... 12

International Harvester v. OSHAC, 628 F.2d 982 (CA 7th Cir., 1980).27,28

Kaiser v. Sec. of Navy and Board for Correction of Naval Records, 525 F. Supp. 1226..... 30

Lee v. City of Peoria, 685 F.2d 196.. 27

Mulvaney v. Stetson, 470 F. Supp. 725..... 30

Nolen v. Schesinger, Sec. of Defense, 492 F.2d 787 (CA 5th Cir.'74)30

Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 90, (1953)..... 10

Pacyna v. Marsh, 617 F. Supp. 101, (W.D.N.Y., 1984).....19,22,33

Page

Pacyna v. Marsh, 751 F.2d 374 (CA 2nd Cir., 1985).....19,34

Pacyna v. Marsh, 106 S.Ct. 844, (1986).....20,34

Pacyna v. Marsh, 809 F.2d 792 (CA Fed. Cir., 1986).....20,34

Pacyna v. Marsh, 107 S.Ct. 3278 (1987).....20,34

Price v. United States, 80 F.Supp. 542,543, 112 Ct.Cl. 198 (1948)..... 10

Ruddies v. Auburn, 261 F.Supp. 648... 25

Savage v. Pickard, 82 Tenn., 46..... 10

Selman v. United States, 204 Ct. Cl. 675, 498 F.2d 1354 (1974)..... 10

Tucker v. Department of the Army, 447 F.Supp. 1207 (D.C.D.C., 1978) Affirmed 593 F.2d 1372, 193 U.S. App. D.C. 218..... 28

Uhley v. United States, 121 F. Supp. 674..... 30

United States v. McLean, 95 U.S. 750 (1878)..... 10

United States v. Mouat, 124 U.S. 303..... 11

United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392,396, 402 (1976)..... 9

United States v. Wickersham, 201 U.S. 390,399 (1906)..... 10

Page

Urbina v. United States, 428, F.2d 1280,1285, 192 Ct. Cl. 875, 882 (1970)..... 10

Van Drasek v. Lehman, Sec. of Navy, 762 F.2d 1065, 1068 (CA D.C. Cir., 1985)..... 32

Williams v. Sec. of Navy, 787 F.2d 552 (Fed. Cir., 1986)..... 31

Yagjian v. Marsh, Sec. of Army, 571 F. Supp. 698..... 30

Yee v. United States, 512 F.2d 1383 (Ct. Cl., 1975)..... 29

Statutes:

5 U.S.C. §702.....3,5,21,23
10 U.S.C. §1552.....Passim
28 U.S.C. §1254(1).....2
28 U.S.C. §1295(a)(2).....20
28 U.S.C. §1346(a)(2).....Passim
28 U.S.C. §1361.....3,5,19,21,23
28 U.S.C. §1631.....2
28 U.S.C. §2401(a).....6,19,25

Other Authorities:

Army Regulation 15-185.....15
Army Regulation 600-148.....15,16
Army Regulation 610-15.....15
Constitution of the United States Amendments V and XIV.....Passim

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OPINIONS BELOW

The Judgment/Order of the Court of Appeals (App. A) and the Memorandum/Order of the district court (App. C) are not reported.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on 10 February, 1989. The

timely petition for rehearing, with suggestion for rehearing en banc, was denied on 13 April, 1989 (App. B). The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. §1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

1. CONSTITUTION, Amend V provides:

> No person shall be denied due process of law.

2. CONSTITUTION, Amend XIV provides:

> No person shall be denied equal protection of law.

3. 28 U.S.C. §1346(a)(2) provides:

> The district courts shall have jurisdiction in any civil action or claim against the United States, not exceeding $10,000 in amount, founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department or upon any express or implied contract with the United States.

§1346(d) provides:

> The district courts shall not have jurisdiction under this section of any civil action or claim for a pension.

4. 28 U.S.C. §1631 provides:

Transfer to cure want of jurisdiction in the interest of justice.

5. 28 U.S.C. §1361 provides:

District courts jurisdiction for actions in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer of the United States...to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.

6. 5 U.S.C. §702 provides:

For "Right of Review" of an agency action on a non monetary claim, where its decision is wrong.

7. 10 U.S.C. §1552 provides:

District courts jurisdiction to review adverse decision by board for correction of military records which is made arbitrarily, capriciously or contrary to law.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

The jurisdictional defects in this case are so voluminous and serious and substantially prejudicial to petitioner as to require vacating all of the orders/judgments heretofore had herein and remand the case (see pg 33, par. 7) infra, even without resort to the requirements for vacature and remand based on the re-

mainder of the record herein. Therefore, the jurisdictional points are set forth for review prior to the factual and non-jurisdictional substantive aspects of the case.

POINT I

A SERIES OF JURISDICTIONAL DEFECTS EXISTS INFRINGING ON CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS

A series of jurisdictional defects exists in this matter, each of which individually mandates vacature of all of the orders/judgments heretofore had herein, infra, and which collectively are so severe as to create an infringement of constitutional rights and privileges if they are not vacated and the case is not remanded, infra.

POINT II

JURISDICTIONAL DEFECTS WERE NEVER DETERMINED

The court of appeals never made a determination that there was probable

cause to believe the instant district court did not act on the fact that the prior district court had no subject matter jurisdiction, as argued by the government, infra.

The court of appeals in its Order/Judgment (App. A) Ordered that the Judgment of the instant district court be and it hereby affirmed substantially for the reasons stated in the Memorandum/Order of Judge John T. Elfvin dated August 14, 1988 (App. C).

The instant timely filed suit on a non monetary claim for review of agency action, proven wrong on the face of the record, accrued in 1982, pursuant to 5 USC 702, 10 USC 1552 and 28 USC 1361, was presented but not litigated in the prior suit heretofore had herein.

In his Memorandum/Order, Judge Elfvin, supra, concluded that the defendants now move to dismiss the Complaint on the

grounds of the applicable statute of limitations, res judicata and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. He specifically Ordered that the defendants' motion to dismiss the Complaint is granted and the Complaint is dismissed with prejudice under the doctrine of res judicata.

The prior suit, in addition to the claim for review, supra, sought monetary damages for rejection of a promotion by the Army, accrued in 1952, for appointment to warrant officer and increase in petitioner's retirement pension, pursuant to 28 USC 1346. In his opinion of March 7, 1984 (App. D), Judge John T. Curtin, district court for the Western District of New York, concluded that petitioner's suit was barred by the six years statute of limitations under 28 USC 2401(a). He specifically held that:

"Although the government vigorously urges that the Court does not have jurisdiction under any theory, I find that there is jurisdiction under 28 USC 1346.

Plaintiff has waived his claim to any monetary award over $10,000.00."

POINT II

STATUTE CLEARLY VIOLATED

The first district court clearly had no jurisdiction under §1346 to bar suit on a monetary claim by the statue of limitations, for at least two (2) reasons, as follows:

(1) As aforementioned, under §1346(a)(2) district courts have jurisdiction in civil actions or claims against the United States, not exceeding $10,000 in amount, founded "upon any express or implied contract with the United States."

As petitioner was seeking money damages for denial by the Army of a promotion as warrant officer, a position to which he was not appointed or served, the district court clearly had no jurisdiction under §1346 because there was no required express or implied contract for such a position with the United States or Army. Fur-

ther, the district court's decision is in conflict with case authorities referred to in POINT V, below.

(2) As aforementioned, as petitioner sought inceases in his pension, therefore the district court had no jurisdiction under S1346(d). §1346(d) clearly states:

"The district courts shall not have jurisdiction under this section of any civil action or claim for a pension."

POINT IV

CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS VIOLATED

The first district court, in rendering a decision had no juridiction under §1346, supra. As aforementioned, the United States Constitution, Amendment V, provides in pertinent part:

"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."

POINT V

DECISION OF THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT IS IN CONFLICT WITH PREVALENT CASE AUTHORITIES

The first district court opinion (App. D), claiming it had jurisdiction under §1346 barring suit by the six years statute of limitations on a claim seeking a position and monetary damages for a position to which Petitioner had never been appointed or served, is in conflict with prevalent case authorities. Cases in which opinions have a bearing on this case are:

United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 396, 402 (1976), in which the U.S. Supreme Court held:

"the respondents had not stated a claim upon which relief could be granted, for they were asking for positions, and pay, to which they had never been appointed. The dissent further argued that there is no constitutional right to a governmental position to which one has not been appointed; that the salary of a Government job is payable only to the person appointed to that position; and that the court has no authority to take over the appointing power that the Constitution, Art. II, §2, has placed in the Executive Department."

"The established rule is that one is not entitled to the benefit of a position

until he has been duly appointed to it. United States v. McLean, 95 U.S. 750 (1878); Ganse v. United States, 180 Ct. Cl. 183,186, 376 F.2d 900,902 (1967)."

Selman v. United States, 204 Ct. Cl. 675, 498 F.2d 1354 (1974), in which the Court held:

"It is true that a Government employee is normally entitled only to the salary of the grade to which he is appointed and serves. Urbina v. United States, 428 F.2d 1280, 1285; 192 Ct. Cl. 875,882 (1970); Price v. United States, 80 F.Supp. 542,543, 112 Ct. Cl. 198, 200 (1948); Brech v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 362 F. Supp. 914, 917 (S.D.N.Y., 1973)."

United States v. Wickersham, 201 U.S. 390,392 (1906), in which the U.S. Supreme Court held:

"Where an officer has been prevented from performing the duities of his office he is entitled to his salary. Fitzsimmons v. Brooklyn, 102 N.Y. 536; Adams v. Justices, 21 Georgia, 206; Savage et al. v. Pickard, 82 Tennesee, 46."

Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 90 (1953), in which the U.S. Supreme Court held:

"The President commissions all Army officers. 5 U.S.C. 811. We have held that, except one holds his appointment

by virtue of a commission from the Predent, he is not an officer of the Army. United States v. Mouat, 124 U.S. 303. Congress has authorized the President alone to appoint Army officers in grades up to and including that of colonel, above which the advice and consent of the senate is required. 55 Stat. 728, as amended, 57 Stat. 380.

"It is obvious that the commissioning of officers in the Army is a matter of discretion within the province of the President as Commander in Chief. Whatever control courts have exerted over tenure or compensation under an appointment, they have never assumed by any process to control the appointing power either in civilan or military positions."

POINT VI

LACK OF JURISDICTION RENDERS ALL ORDERS OR JUDGMENTS A NULLITY

Accordingly, the first district court barring suit on the statute of limitations over which it had no jurisdiction predicated on §1346, and the second district court barring suit by res judicata does not lie.

In Air Transport Assn v. PATCO, 516 F.Supp. 1108, Affirmed 667 F.2d 316, the Court cited:

"If a court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction at the outset of a lawsuit, all decrees, judgments, orders, etc., of that court and, for that matter, all appellate decisions in the action are a nullity (Federal Courts Key 542, Judgments Key 16)."

POINT VII

THE GOVERNMENT'S ACTION IN DEALING WITH THE JURISDICTIONAL ISSUE BORDERS ON THE IRRESPONSIBLE

In both the first and second district court actions, the government moved to dismiss petitioner's suit on grounds of lack of jurisdiction, aforementioned, but when the courts barred suit on jurisdiction and res judicata, favorable to it, respectively, the Government double shifted its position to one of silence/acceptance on the jurisdictional issue.

An opinion in Hurick v. Lehman, 782 F.2d 986, which has a bearing on this case, held:

"The government's action in dealing with the jurisdictional issue bordered on the irresponsible. The government's double shift of position on the issue betokens a casual approach to this important question that we cannot and do not condone."

STATEMENT

1. Petitioner is an Army master sergeant (pay grade E-7) who retired from active duty in 1962 after completing over 20 years of "outstanding" military service, both in combat and as a counter-intelligence agent (66-72).*

2. In August 1951, while a master sergeant and serving as a counter-intelligence agent in the Army, petitioner applied for a promotion to the position of warrant officer in the Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC). His immediate superiors as well as a board of officers, first Army commanding general and the Army's surgeon general highly approved his appointment and physical qualifications, respectively (57-59).*

3. In a letter, dated 22 January 1952, petitioner was notified through Army channels that he had been selected for

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* Indicates page(s) of appendix to petitioner's brief to the Court of Appeals.

appointment by his First Army Headquarters and that his application was forwarded to The Adjutant General (TAG) in accordance with current directives. However, TAG informed that headquarters that petitioner's appointment was not favorably considered. Significantly, the letter or notification, the only document then in petitioner's possession prior to 1979 relative to the matter, failed to contain required, infra, reason(s) for the disapproval (App. E).

4. Immediately thereafter the denial in 1952, attempts to obtain the reasons for disapproval met with the Army's directive "you don't question higher authority" (56).*

5. On 13 June 1980 petitioner filed an application accompanied by 31 enclosures of substantial proof of evidence on the face of the record with the Army Board for Correction of Military Records (ABCMR), seeking reversal of the prior

determination, which denied him advancement to warrant officer status, back pay, etc., pursuant to Army Regulation (AR) 15-185 (29-38)* and under the provisions to recover on disability created by statute 10 USC 1552(a)&(b). §1552 provides for correction of military records from error or removal of an injustice, in the interest of substantial justice.

6. Petitioner's grievance, supported by substantial evidence, to the ABCMR was based on the Army's prevalent violations of its own regulations AR 600-148 (47-54)* supplementing AR 610-15 (39-46)*, and due process rights, briefly as follows:

a. In violation of AR 600-148, Section II par. 7e and Section III par. 9e, requiring notification of the reason (s) for disapproval, supra.

b. In violation of Constitutional rights, Amend. V and XIV, the Army denied due process to obtain the reason(s) for

disapproval, supra.

c. In violation of AR 600-148, Section II par. 5b(2), petitioner's application when ruled upon by CIC and TAG contained neither the required request for educational Waiver, with prerequisites nor his immediate commander's comment recommending approval or disapproval with the reasons therefore. The application was complete when initially filed and forwarded by First Army Headquarters to TAG, supra. The Army reported, indicating that the waiver and comment are the only documents not a matter of record (61-62).*

d. In violation of AR 600-148, Section II par. 7d, as petitioner's application, although not his fault, when ruled upon incomplete, was required to be returned to him for completion in compliance with said provisions.

7. Notwithstanding the substantial evidence proven on the face of the record,

supra, the ABCMR denied petitioner's application (73-74)*, request for reconsideration (75-82)* and vigorous appeal to the Secretary of the Army. The ABCMR's final decision on 20 July 1982 in part states substantially: that your vigorous dissent has been noted; that there is no material error or injustice in the Department's denial of Sergeant Pacyna's application for appointment as a warrant officer in 1952; that the denial constituted final agency action; that petitioner was not barred from asking for reconsideration upon discovery of additional substantive evidence; and that petitioner has the right to institute action in a Federal Court (App. F).

8. The ABCMR in a communication, dated 3 October 1980 addressed to The Judge Advocate General (TJAG), requested that appropriate corrective administrative action be taken upon a finding of legal

deficiency in the Department's denial of plaintiff's application for appointment of warrant officer in 1952 (28).* Nevertheless, TJAG reported that "no legal error was found" (84)*, despite the record it reviewed, inclusive of the violations and regulations had before it, supra.

FIRST COURT ACTION

9. As it was futile to further appeal to the ABCMR, petitioner commenced his first suit by attorney representation in the federal district court for the Western District of New York on 23 January 1983. As aforementioned, he sought an order appointing him to warrant officer, award of back pay to 1952 and increase in his retirement pension and review of the ABCMR's final decision in 1982. He alleged that the district court's jurisdiction on the monetary appointment claim was based on the Tucker Act, 28 USC 1346, and review of the ABCMR's final denial

was based on the mandamus statute 28 USC 1361 and 10 USC 1552.

10. In his opinion of March 7, 1984, Judge Curtin concluded that Plaintiff's claims accrued in 1952, at the latest, 1962, and therefore were time barred under 28 USC 2401(a). He held that although the government vigorously urges that the court does not have jurisdiction under any theory, he found that there was justification under §1346. Plaintiff had waived his claim to the monetary award over $10,000.00. (App. D).

11. Judge Curtin granted the government's motion for summary judgment and dismissed petitioner's complaint. Pacyna v. Marsh, No. Civ-83-205C, 617 F. Supp. 101 (W.D.N.Y., 1984).

12. The court of appeals for the second circuit affirmed the decision. Pacyna v. Marsh, No. 84-6200, 751 F.2d 374 (1985).

13. The U.S. Supreme Court granted petitioner's certiorari, vacating judgment and remanding case for the court of appeals to transfer the case pursuant to 28 USC 1631 to the court of appeals for the Federal Circuit (see 28 USC 1295(a)(2)). Pacyna v. Marsh, No. 84-1706, 106 S.Ct. 844 (1986).

14. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court (Judge Curtin). Pacyna v. Marsh, No. 86-1488, 809 F.2d 792(1986).

15. Petitioner's petition for a writ of certiorari was denied by the U.S. Supreme Court. Pacyna v. Marsh, No. 86-1136, 107 S.CT. 3278 (1987).

SECOND COURT ACTION

16. On 10 December 1987, petitioner instituted a second suit. Because he did not realize that there existed a fatal jurisdictional defect, etc. committed by the first district court, and that the

government acted irresponsible on the jurisdictional issue, supra, he commenced the instant suit pro se in the United States District Court, Western District of New York.

17. The instant suit soley sought judicial review of the ABCMR's final decision on 20 July 1982 on a non monetary claim for alleged agency wrong, pursuant to "Right of Review" under 5 USC 702, and the mandamus statute 28 USC 1361 and 10 USC 1552. Petitioner's ground for the suit was that his claim for "Right of Review" of a wrong by the agency's action had accrued in 1982, not 1952 or at the latest 1962, and that it was not subject to the statute of limitations, although it had been presented, but was not litigated in prior proceedings heretofore had herein.

18. In his opinion of 14 August 1988, Judge Elfvin specifically stated in part that a similar, if not identical, compla-

int was dismissed by John T. Curtin of this United States District Court on grounds that it was barred by the applicable six year statute of limitations for action against the United States. Pacyna v. Marsh, 617 F. Supp. 101 (W.D. N.Y., 1984), supra. That the defendants now move to dismiss the Complaint on the grounds of the applicable statute of limitations, res judicata and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Judge Elfvin concluded that the Plaintiff's claim was barred by res judicata. Accordingly, he Ordered that the defendants' motion to dismiss the Complaint is granted and the Complaint is dismissed with prejudice. (App. C).

19. The court of appeals for the second circuit affirmed the decision. Pacyna v. Marsh, et al, No. 88-6230 on 10 February 1989 (App. A). Petition for rehearing en banc was denied on 13 April 1989 (App. B).

ARGUMENT

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

From the very outset of the first and second federal district court suits, Appellant did not raise or consider the jurisdictional issue. He first raised the jurisdictional defect in his motion for rehearing en banc to the instant court of appeals, which denied his motion. Prior to Appellant's motion for rehearing en banc, his argument has always been that the courts have jurisdiction of his claim for review of the ABCMR or agency wrong accrued in 1982, which has not been litigated in prior proceedings heretofore had herein, infra, and which is not subject to the statute of limitations. Therefore, his claim is subject to review pursuant to §702, §1361 and §1552, and supported by numerous case authorities and constitutional provisions, supra, infra.

The grounds upon which granting certiorari is asked for are set forth in great detail in the opening preliminary statement, supra, and, concisely stated, are as follows:

1. As aforementioned, a series of jurisdictional defects exists in this case in violation of statute and infringing on constitutional Amendment V and XIV "due process" and "equal protection" rights.

The jurisdictional defect existing in the first action for monetary damages before Judge Curtin, who barred the claim by the statute of limitations and claimed to have jurisdiction under §1346, was never determined by the first court of appeals, which affirmed, supra. In the instant non monetary action for review of agency action, Judge Elfvin barred suit by res judicata, which was affirmed by the instant court of appeals, supra.

As the first district court or Judge

Curtin had no jurisdiction under §1346 to bar suit by the statute of limitations under §2401(a) where there clearly was no express or implied contract on a monetary claim with the United States, supra. Therefore, Judge Curtin's decision to bar suit is void, and his judgment is not a valid one. In addition, Judge Curtin did not have, nor no court has, the power to make an Army appointment nor jurisdiction over a claim for pension under §1346, as requested by petitioner, supra.

That the lack of subject matter jurisdiction at the outset of the law suit renders all prior or subsequent decrees, judgments, orders, etc. of that district court and for that matter, all appellate decisions in the action a nullity and of no effect, supra. Also see Ruddies v. Auburn, 261 F. Supp. 648.

2. That the Appellant's non monetary claim presented for judicial review of

the ABCMR's final decision accrued in July 1982, was not litigated in either the first or second suit.

The issue in this instant action, not resolved by this Court, is whether principles of res judicata may bar Appellant's district court action where the claim is on a question of law that there exists a fatal jurisdictional defect at the outset of the suit and that therefore there is no required valid final judgment on the merits in the case, supra.

Neither the first nor second district court based its decision on the full and fair opportunity test afforded by other courts on the same subject matter.

The basic elements of the doctrine of res judicata are stated in, but not limited to, case authorities, as follows:

a. Dore v. Kleppe, 522 F.2d 1369 (CA 5th Cir., 1976) held:

"Key to deciding whether res judicata applies is a determination of whether se-

cond suit involves the same cause of action as the prior litigation; if the cause of action is different in the second suit the parties are estopped from relitigating only those issues actually and necessarily decided in the first suit. Res judicata is a principle of public policy and should be applied as to give rather than deny justice."

b. International Harvester v. OSHRC, 628 F.2d 982 (CA 7th Cir., 1980) held:

"Action against company... was not barred by res judicata, since in both prior actions ... the issue was not litigated or decided on its merits."

c. Lee v. City of Peoria, 685 F.2d 196; Cerbone v. Westchester County, 508 F. Supp. 780; Aetna Life v. McCabe, 556 F. Supp. 1342; and Dunnhausen v. First Nat. Bank, 538 F. Supp. 551, held:

"Res judicata or estoppel principles do not apply where litigant did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate relevant issue in earlier suit."

3. In the prior proceedings heretofore had herein, no federal district or appellate court made a determination whether the ABCMR's action was improper or not. The absent of such determination is in

conflict with prevalent case authorities in dealing with other veterans' cases on the same subject matter as res judicata. Such determinations were made in Blevins v. Orr, 721 F.2d 1419 (D.C. Cir., 1983); Tucker v. Department of the Army, 447 F. Supp. 1207 (D.C.D.C., 1978) affirmed 593 F.2d 1372, 193 U.S. App. D.C. 218; and Hardison v. Alexander, 655 F.2d 1281 (D.C. Cir., 1981) citing Dilley v. Alexander, 603 F.2d 914 (D.C. Cir., 1979).

In Dilley v. Alexander, supra, the court held:

> "As judge MacKinnon speaking for this court in Dilley, concluded:", "It is the duty of the federal courts to inquire whether an action of a military agency conforms to the law, or is instead arbitrary, capricious or contrary to the statutes and regulations governing that agency". "It is to this limited but critical inquiry that we now turn."

See non-veterans relitigation cases: Dore v. Kleppe and International Harvester v. OSHRC, supra, which reversed and remanded.

In Yee v. United States, 512 F.2d 1383 (1975), the court held:

"When a military correction board fails to correct an injustice clearly presented in the records before it, it is acting in violation of its mandate, and such violation, contrary to the evidence, is arbitrary and capricious."

4. Appellant's non monetary claim for judicial review of the ABCMR's final de-decision is not barred by the statute of limitations, pursuant to prevalent case authorities below.

In both the first and second suits:

"Where wrong for which Appellant sought judicial redress was not alleged error in his military record, which was committed, if at all, upon denial of promotion in 1952, or at the latest upon his retirement in 1962, but the alleged arbitrary and capricious deprivation of his rights, conferred by Act of Congress, 10 USC 1552, to an action "necessary to correct and error or remove an injustice", his suit was not barred by the statute of limitations when

filed in February 1983, after his June 13, 1980, application to correct records had been denied finally on 20 July 1982. See: Uhley v. United States, 121 F. Supp 674; Yagjian v. Marsh, Sec. of Army, 571 F. Supp. 698; Kaiser v. Sec. of Navy and Board for Correction of Naval Records, 52 F. Supp. 1226; Mulvaney v. Stetson, 470 F. Supp. 725; Ashe v. McNamara, 355 F.2d 277 (CA 1st Cir., 1965) and Nolen v. Schlesinger, Sec. of Defense, 492 F.2d 787 (CA 5h Cir., 1974), to name just a few of many such cases recorded in the l library, dating back 8, 38, 33, 24, 17 a 17 years, respectively. Also see Hamlin United States, 391 F.2d 941.

5. Other significant points raised in case authorities are:

Hahn v. United States, 757 F.2d 581 (CA 3rd Cir., 1985) cited:

"District court jurisdiction over suit for nonmonetary relief is not foreclosed by fact that it may be basis for award o damages against the United States. 28

USCA §1346, 1491."

Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967), reversed and remanded, held in pertinent part:

"the Administrative Procedure Act, which embodies the basic presumption of judicial review to one "suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute," 5 USC §702, so long as no statute precludes such relief or the action is not one committed by law to agency discretion, 5 USC §701(a). The Administrative Procedure Act provides specifically not only for review of "(a)gency action made reviewable by statute" but also for review of "final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court, " 5 USC §704."

Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 228, 244 (1937), reversed, held:

"The allegations of the petition show that there is a controversy of a definite and substantial character." "It is the nature of the controversy, not the method of its presentation or the particular party who presents it, that is determinative."

Williams v. Sec. of Navy, 787 F.2d 552 (Fed. Cir., 1986), held in pertinent part:

"The district court should not have dismissed Williams complaint on the merits,

but at the outset should have granted the government's motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust remedies available to him within the military."

With respect to holding in Williams above, the court of appeals for the federal circuit in the Appellant's within case, should have held that the district court or Judge Curtin should not have dismissed his Complaint on the non monetary merits, but at the outset should have granted the government's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the monetary claim.

6. Because the jurisdictional issue is paramount here, a comparison is made between the cavalier manner in which the decisions below were made in this case with the inquiry made in great detail into the jurisdictional issue by the court in Van Drasek v. Lehman, Sec. of Navy, 762 F.2d 1065 (CA D.C. Cir., 1985), which held in part:

"As explained in greater detail below,

for a claim in the district court to be based on the Tucker Act, it must (1) seek money (2) not exceeding $10,000 (3) from the United States and (4) be founded either upon a contract or upon a provision of "the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department," 28 U.S.C. §1346(a)(2), that can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for damages sustained." "United States v. Mitchell, 463 L.Ed2d 580 (1983). If any of these requirements are not met, the claim falls outside the scope of the Tucker Act, and this court would retain appellate jurisdiction over the entire case."

In Appellant's within case, the monetary claim falls outside the Tucker Act because under §1346 he cannot sue for a position not had, nor for a pension, nor did the district court have the power to promote him to warrant officer, supra.

7. For the foregoing reasons, in the interest of substantive justice, this Court should in this within case, ORDER:

a. The district court or Judge Curtin's Order/Judgment, No. Civ-83-205C, 617 F.Supp. 101 (W.D.N.Y., 1984) vacated in part on the monetary claim and remanded on the non monetary claim for agency

review.

b. The court of appeals for the second circuit of New York's Order/Judgment No. 84-6200, 751 F.2d 374 (1985), vacated

c. The U.S. Supreme Court's Order/Judgment, No. 84-1706, 106 S.Ct. 844 (1986), vacating and transferring case to the court of appeals for the federal circuit, vacated.

d. The court of appeals for the Federal Circuit's Order/Judgment, No. 86-1488, 809 F.2d 792 (1986), vacated.

e. The U.S. Supreme Court's Order/Judgment denying certiorari, No. 86-1136, 107 S.Ct. 3278 (1987), vacated.

f. The district court or Judge Elfvin's Order/Judgment, No. Civ-87-1531E (1988), unreported, vacated.

g. The court of appeals for the second circuit of New York's Order/Judgment, No. 88-6230 (1989), unreported, vacated.

h. or, in the alternative to par. a. above, with respect to remand to the district court, remand the case to the ABCM R, with instructions, because the case is permeated with prevalent court tainted and government irresponsible actions since 1983 and Army violations of its own regulations since 1952, supra, all of which are adverse to Appellant.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted.

CLEMENT J. PACYNA, Pro se
MSG, U.S. Army, Retired
1151 Wehrle Drive
Williamsville, New York 14221
Telephone: (716) 632-4078

June 1989.

APPENDICES

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND CIRCUIT

At a stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the United States Courthouse in the City of New York, on the 10th day of February, one thousand nine hundred and eighty-nine.

Present: Honorable J. Edward Lumbard,
Honorable Amalya L. Kearse,
Honorable Ralph K. Winter,
Circuit Judges.

CLEMENT J. PACYNA,
MSG, U.S. Army Retired
Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

JOHN O. MARSH, JR., in his capacity as Secretary of the Army, Army Board for Correction of Military Records, and JOHN W. MATTHEWS, in his capacity as Executive Secretary of the Board,
Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of New York.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of record from the United States

District Court for the Western District of New York, and was submitted by Plaintiff pro se and by counsel for defendants.

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed that the judgment of said District Court be and it hereby affirmed substantially for the reasons stated in the Memorandum and Order of Judge John T. Elfvin dated August 14, 1988.

/s/J. EDWARD LUMBARD
J. Edward Lumbard, U.S.C.J.

/s/AMALYA L. KEARSE
AMALYA L. KEARSE, U.S.C.J.

/s/RALPH K. WINTER
RALPH K. WINTER, U.S.C.J.

Filed FEB 10 1989

N.B. This summary order will not be published in the Federal Reporter and should not be cited or otherwise relied upon in unrelated cases before this or any other court.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND CIRCUIT

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals, in and for the Second Circuit, held at the United States Courthouse, in the City of New York, on the 13th day of April, one thousand nine hundred and eighty-nine.

FILED April 13, 1989

CLEMENT J. PACYNA,
MSG, U.S. Army retired,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

JOHN O. MARSH, JR., in his capacity as Secretary of the Army, Army Board for Correction of Military Records, and JOHN W. MATTHEWS, in his capacity as Executive Secretary of the Board.

A petition for rehearing containing a suggestion that the action be reheard in banc having been filed herein by plaintiff-appellant, CLEMENT J. PACYNA, pro se.

Upon consideration by the panel that heard the appeal, it is ORDERED that said petition for rehearing is denied.

It is further noted that the suggestion

for rehearing in banc has been transmitted to the judges of the court in regular active service and to any other judge that heard the appeal and that no such judge has requested that a vote be taken thereon.

s/ELAINE B. GOLDSMITH
ELAINE B. GOLDSMITH
Clerk

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

CLEMENT J. PACYNA,
MSG, U.S. Army Retired,
Plaintiff,

v.

JOHN O. MARSH, JR., in his capacity as Secretary of the Army, Army Board for Correction of Military Records, and JOHN W. MATHHEWS, in his capacity as Executive Secretary of the Board,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CIV-87-1531E

This is an action seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Army Board for Correction of Military Records ("the Board"). The plaintiff, acting pro se asks this Court to correct his military records to reflect his appointment to Warrant Officer in the United States Army which appointment was denied by the Army in 1952. The defendants now move to dismiss the Complaint on the grounds of the applicable statute of limitations, res judicata and lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

A similar, if not identical, Complaint

was dismissed by Judge John T. Curtin of this United States District Court on the grounds that it was barred by the applicable six-year statute of limitations for action against the United States.[1] Pacyna v. Marsh, 617 F.Supp. 101, 102 (W.D.N.Y., 1984). In that action the plaintiff had named only Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh, Jr. as a defendant and had sought to have his records corrected to reflect his appointment to Warrant Officer and also that his retirement pay be increased to reflect such appointment. Complaint, Pacyna v. Marsh, supra (Civ. No. 83-205C), Exhibit A to Donald P. Simet, Esq. Affidavit (sworn to February 5, 1988). Judge Curtin held that the cause of action had accrued in 1952 when the plaintiff's application for promotion had been denied and

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1. 28 U.S.C. §2401(a) provides that "Every civil action commenced against the United States shall be barred unless the Complaint is filed within six years after the right of action first accrues."

that his action therefore was barred by the six-year statute of limitations.[2]

Judge Curtin was underwhelmed by the plaintiff's contention -- the same contention as is made here -- that the right of action did not accrue until 1982 when his records were denied, and held that the plaintiff could not revive his claim by applying to the Board in 1981 and 1982 and contending that its current adverse decision created anew his cause of action. Pacyna v. Marsh, supra, at 103. Accordingly, the defendant Marsh's motion for summary judgment dismissing the Complaint was granted by Judge Curtin. This decision was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Pacyna v. Marsh, 809 F.2d 792 (1986). cert denied,

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2. Judge Curtin found that, even if the statute of limitations had been tolled while the plaintiff was on active duty pursuant to the Soldiers and Sailor's Civil Relief Act of 1940, 50 U.S.C. App. §501 et seq., his claim would have accrued upon his retirement in 1962. Pacyna v. Marsh, supra, at 102.

___U.S.___, 107 S.Ct. 2177, reh-g denied, ___U.S.___, 107 S.Ct. 3278 (1987); Exhibit D to Simet Affidavit.[3]

The plaintiff maintains that the instant action is not barred by the doctrine of res judicata inasmuch as it is soley an action for review of the new decision by the Board, whereas his earlier action was one for monetary damages. This contention is wholly without merit. Both actions request the same relief -- viz., the correction of his military records to reflect an appointment to the rank of Warrant Officer. The factual allegations in both complaints are vitually identical; it appears that the plaintiff copied the in-

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3. The United States Court of Appeals for Federal Circuit held that the cause of action had accrued in 1952 and that the plaintiff's contention that the Court must review the Board's 1981 and 1982 decisions concerning a matter that accrued 31 years before this action was commenced was contrary to law. Copy of Unpublished Opinion, Pacyna v. Marsh, 809 F.2d 792 (1986) (per curiam), Exhibit D to Simet Affidavit.

stant complaint from the previous one which had been prepared by an attorney. The only distinctions are the way the claim for relief is phrased and the addition of another defendant. These distinctions do not change the fact that the plaintiff is again attempting to get judicial review of the same old decision by the United States Army.

The doctrine of res judicata is well established and its basic principles are familiar. "(A) valid, final judgment on the merits bars a second action by the same plaintiff or his privy against the same defendant or his privy, on the same cause of action***." 1B J. Moore, J.D. Lucas & T. Currier, Moore's Federal Practice 10.411(2), p. 396 (2d ed 1984); see also N.L.R.B. v. United Technologies Corp., 706 F.2d 1254, 1259 (2d Cir. 1983). An earlier judgment precludes subsequent litigation of issues actually decided in the

first action and of issues that could have been raised therein but were not, ibid.; Browning Debenture Holders' Com. v. DASA Corp., 605 F.2d 35,39 (2d Cir. 1978), as long as the two actions arise from the same transaction or series of transactions. See Isaac v. Schwartz, 706 F.2d 15, 17 (1st Cir. 1983).

Minor semantic distinctions can not allow the plaintiff to escape the doctrine of res judicata. The fact that the plaintiff named an additional defendant -- i. e., John W. Matthews -- does not save the Complaint. "There is privity between officers of the same government so that a judgment in a suit between a party and a representative of the United States is res judicata in relitigation of the same issue between that party and another officer of the government." Sunshine Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 402,403 (1940).

The plaintiff asks this Court to allow

him to do that what was earlier held he could not do -- i.e. obtain judicial review of a decision that was made 36 years ago.

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the defendants' motion to dismiss the Complaint is granted and the Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.

Dated: Buffalo, N.Y.
August 14, 1988

/s/ JOHN T. ELFVIN
U.S.D.J.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CIV-83-205C

CLEMENT J. PACYNA,

Plaintiff

v.

JOHN O. MARSH, JR.,
Secretary of the Army,

Defendant.

In this case, plaintiff seeks review of a final decision of the Secretary of the Army. Defendant moves to dismiss on the ground that plaintiff has failed to state a claim and, in the alternative, for summary judgment. The basis for these motions is lack of jurisdiction, statute of limitations, and laches.

The history of this litigation is a long one. It began in 1951, when plaintiff was serving as a master sergeant and applied for an appointment as a warrant officer in the Counter-intelligence Corps (CIC). Although he received approval from his local

commanders, on January 3 (sic), 1952, he was informed that his application did not receive final approval.

Plaintiff continued in military service until 1962, when he retired from the Army with the status of "retired reserve." Nothing occurred after that until February of 1979, when plaintiff made an application through the Freedom of Information Act and examined his personnel file.

On June 13, 1980, plaintiff filed an application with the Army Board for Correction of Military Records (ABCMR), seeking to have his 1952 promotion denial reversed and his records corrected accordingly. Plaintiff claims that his application was timely because it was filed within three years after he discovered the error in his record. In the fall of 1980, the ABCMR solicited and obtained an advisory opinion from the Office of the Judge Advocate General. A copy of the opinion, which re-

commended that plaintiff's claim be denied, was sent to him for his comment. Plaintiff responded in February of 1981.

After considering plaintiff's response, the Board concluded that plaintiff had not given any reason to explain why the action not to appoint him was illegal or in violation of regulations. The Board also held that his failure to timely file his application had made efforts by the Army to investigate his claim difficult. Because of his 28-year delay in challenging the decision made in 1952, only limited documentation is available. This decision was affirmed by the Secretary of the Army on June 7, 1982. Plaintiff's suit followed in February, 1983, with plaintiff claiming that failure to appoint him as a warrant officer was an abuse of discretion and a violation of his rights. He seeks an order of the court appointing him to the rank of warrant officer and retirement pay, including back

payment to the time of the initial denial.

Assuming for the moment that this court has jurisdiction, it is clear that plaintiff's claim is barred by the statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C. §2401(a) provides that a civil suit against the United States must be commenced within six years after the right of action first accrues. The statute may not be waived in actions against the United States. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 (1979). "(A) cause of action is deemed to have accrued when facts exist which enable one party to maintain an action against another." Konecny v. United States, 388 F.2d 59, 65 (8th Cir. 1967), quoting Great American Ins. Co. v. Louis Lesser Enterprises, Inc. 353 F.2d 997, 1001 (8th Cir. 1965).

The file in this case was complete in 1952, when plaintiff's application for promotion was rejected. Plaintiff argues that he was not able to obtain the facts

until he looked at his personnel file through a Freedom of Information Act Procedure in 1979, but there was no reason why he could not have reviewed his personnel records at an earlier date. Even if the statute of limitations was tolled during the period plaintiff remained on active duty, pursuant to the Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act of 1940, 50 U.S. C. App. §501 et seq., his cause of action would have accrued upon his retirement in 1962.

Cases such as Kaiser v. Secretary of the Navy, 525 F.Supp 1226 (D. Col. 1981), cited by Plaintiff in support of his application, do not apply here. The statute of limitations did not apply in Kaiser, because the nature of the relief sought in that case was to correct a discharge from dishonorable to honorable. In that type of case, or cases in which the applicant seeks to expunge the judgment of a court martial,

the statute of limitations is not a bar. However, in cases like the present one where the relief sought is money, the statute of limitations is a bar if the case is untimely filed. In this case, the plaintiff wants his records corrected and, at the same time, he wants the government to increase his retirement pay.

Plaintiff cannot revive his claim by applying to the ABCMR in 1981 and claiming that the 1982 decision revived the jurisdictional statute. To do this would permit a plaintiff to have the power to avoid the jurisdictional bar every time he submitted an application which was considered by the Board. Thus, whether his claim accrued in 1952 or at the time of his retirement in 1962, the time to institute the suit has long passed.

Although the government vigorously urges that the court does not have jurisdiction under any theory, I find that there is

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1346. Plaintiff has waived his claim to any monetary award over $10,000.00.

Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted, and the complaint is dismissed.

So ordered.

/S/ JOHN T. CURTIN
USDJ

Dated: March 7, 1984.

E1

HEADQUARTERS FIRST ARMY
GOVERNORS ISLAND, NEW YORK 4, N.Y.

AHFAG-MP 201 Pacyna,Clement J. 22 JAN 1952

SUBJECT: Temporary Appointment as Warrant Officer

THRU: Commanding Officer
108th CIC Detachment
Boston Army Base
Boston, Massachusetts

TO: M/Sgt Clement J. Pacyna, RA20275571

1. Your application for temporary appointment as warrant officer was received at this headquarters and you were tentatively selected for appointment. Your application was forwarded to The Adjutant General in accordance with current directives.

2. The Adjutant General has informed this headquarters that your appointment as warrant officer, junior grade, Army of the United States in Counter-intelligence career warrant is not favorably considered.

BY COMMAND OF

LIEUTENANT GENERAL CRITTENBERGER:

/S/JEROME L. BAES
JEROME L. BAES
1st Lieut, AGC
Asst Adj Gen

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310
20 Jul 1982

SFMR

Mr. Timothy R. Lovallo, Esq.
950 Ellicott Square Building
Buffalo, New York 14203

Dear Mr. Lovallo:

This is in reply to your letter of 7 July 1982 to the Deputy Assistant Secretary concerning the case of Master Sergeant Clement J. Pacyna, 106-05-7846, United States Army Retired.

Your vigorous dissent has been noted. However, all evidence currently of record clearly indicates that there was no material error or injustice in the Department's denial of Sergeant Pacyna's application for appointment as a warrant officer in 1952.

Please be advised that within the Department of Defense, the authority to effect the change you seek in Sergeant Pacyna's records can be exercised only through the

Board for Correction of Military Records. Accordingly, there is no higher administrative appeal within the Department of Defense.

Should you discover additional substantive evidence not previously submitted, you may ask for reconsideration of Sergeant Pacyna's case. Otherwise this letter constitutes final agency action on his request for correction of military records. However, if you desire additional review of the Board's actions, then you have the right to institute action in a Federal court of competent jurisdiction.

Sincerely,

/s/JOHN W. MATTHEWS
JOHN W. MATTHEWS
Executive Secretary
Board for Correction
of Military Records

Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
AUG 10 1989
JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR.
CLERK

No. 88-2026

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1989

CLEMENT J. PACYNA, PETITIONER

v.

JOHN O. MARSH, JR., SECRETARY OF THE ARMY, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION

KENNETH W. STARR
Solicitor General
STUART E. SCHIFFER
Acting Assistant Attorney General
WILLIAM KANTER
MARY K. DOYLE
Attorneys

Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
(202) 633-2217

QUESTION PRESENTED

In a prior action, petitioner's claim challenging the Army's decision not to promote him to warrant officer was dismissed as time-barred. The question presented is whether the court of appeals properly affirmed the dismissal of petitioner's present action, which challenges the same decision, on the ground of *res judicata*.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Opinions below	1
Jurisdiction	1
Statement	1
Argument	6
Conclusion	11

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Allen v. *McCurry*, 449 U.S. 90 (1980)	10
American Surety Co. v. *Baldwin*, 287 U.S. 156 (1932)	7
Armstrong v. *Manzo*, 380 U.S. 545 (1965)	10
Ellingson v. *Burlington Northern, Inc.*, 653 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1981)	8
Hamlin v. *United States*, 391 F.2d 941 (Ct. Cl. 1968)	8
Insurance Corp. v. *Compagnie des Bauxites*, 456 U.S. 694 (1982)	7
Kaiser v. *Secretary of Navy*, 525 F. Supp. 1226 (D. Colo. 1981)	8
Mathis v. *Laird*, 457 F.2d 926 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 871 (1972)	8
Mulvaney v. *Stetson*, 470 F. Supp. 725 (N.D. Ill. 1979)	8
Nathan v. *Rowan*, 651 F.2d 1223 (6th Cir. 1981)	8
Pacyna v. *Marsh*:	
474 U.S. 1078 (1986)	5
481 U.S. 1048 (1987)	5
483 U.S. 1034 (1987)	5
No. 413-87C (Cl. Ct. Nov. 9, 1987)	5
PRC Harris, Inc. v. *Boeing Co.*, 700 F.2d 894 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 936 (1983)	8
Rose v. *Town of Harwich*, 778 F.2d 77 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159 (1986)	8
Stoll v. *Gottlieb*, 305 U.S. 165 (1938)	7
Underwriters Nat'l Assurance Co. v. *North Carolina Guaranty Ass'n*, 455 U.S. 691 (1982)	7
Yagjian v. *Marsh*, 571 F. Supp. 698 (D.N.H. 1983)	8

Statutes: Page

Tucker Act:
28 U.S.C. 1346 ..... 3, 4, 5, 7, 8
28 U.S.C. 1346(a)(2) 4
5 U.S.C. 702 ..... 6, 9
10 U.S.C. 1552 ..... 3, 6
28 U.S.C. 1295(a)(2) 5
28 U.S.C. 1361 ..... 3, 6
28 U.S.C. 2401(a) 4, 5, 9

Miscellaneous:

Restatement (Second) of Judgments (1982) 7
18 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, *Federal Practice and Procedure* (1981 & Supp. 1989) 7

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1989

No. 88-2026

CLEMENT J. PACYNA, PETITIONER

v.

JOHN O. MARSH, JR., SECRETARY OF THE ARMY, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. A1-A2) is unreported. The decision of the district court (Pet. App. C1-C7) is unreported.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on February 10, 1989. A petition for rehearing was denied on April 13, 1989. Pet. App. B1-B2. The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on June 12, 1989. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

STATEMENT

1. Petitioner is a former Army master sergeant who voluntarily retired from active duty in 1962 after completing 20 years of military service. Pet. 13. In August

1951, while serving as a counter-intelligence agent in the Army, petitioner applied for a promotion to the position of warrant officer in the Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC). *Ibid.* His superior officers, as well as a board of officers, recommended his selection, but the CIC ultimately declined to approve the appointment because petitioner did not meet the education requirement for the position.[1] In January 1952, petitioner's commanding officer informed him that his application had not been approved. Pet. App. D1-D2. Petitioner took no action to challenge this decision at any time between 1952 and his voluntary retirement from the Army ten years later.

Seventeen years after his retirement, in February 1979, petitioner requested and obtained his military personnel records from the Department of the Army. Pet. App. D2. The following year, on June 13, 1980, he applied to the Army Board for the Correction of Military Records (ABCMR or Board) seeking correction of his records to reflect a promotion to warrant officer retroactive to 1952. *Ibid.* The Board solicited and obtained an advisory opinion from the Judge Advocate General of the Army concerning petitioner's request. *Ibid.* That opinion, which recommended that petitioner's request be denied, was sent to petitioner for his comments. Pet. App. D2-D3.

On February 25, 1981, following a full review of petitioner's application, his response to the Judge Advocate

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[1] Under Army and CIC regulations in force at the time, an applicant for warrant officer was required to have completed two years of college or the equivalent. Gov't Br. in Opp. 2 n.1 in *Pacyna* v. *Marsh*, No. 86-1136. Petitioner left high school in the ninth grade and later obtained a high school equivalency certificate. *Ibid.* Although an applicant could request a waiver of this requirement, petitioner's records do not indicate that he made such a request. *Ibid.* Moreover, it was determined at the time that petitioner's record would not have justified the grant of an educational waiver in any event. *Ibid.*

General's opinion, his military records, and other material, the Board concluded that petitioner had failed to furnish any material evidence indicating that the 1952 decision not to promote him to warrant officer was in any way unlawful or unjust. The Board also concluded that petitioner's 28-year delay in challenging that decision made it difficult to obtain evidence concerning his claim. Pet. App. D3; Gov't Br. in Opp. 3 in *Pacyna* v. *Marsh*, No. 86-1136. Accordingly, the Board denied petitioner's application and notified him of its decision. Petitioner sought reconsideration of the Board's decision on four separate occasions, and each of these requests was denied. 86-1136 Gov't Br. 3-4.

2. On February 23, 1983, petitioner filed suit against respondent John O. Marsh, Jr., in the United States District Court for the Western District of New York. He alleged that the district court's jurisdiction was based on the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346, the mandamus statute, 28 U.S.C. 1361, and the provision for administrative correction of military records, 10 U.S.C. 1552. Gov't C.A. App. 2. He claimed that the denial of his application for appointment represented an abuse of discretion, violated his due process rights, and was arbitrary and capricious, and that he had been denied his promotion in violation of applicable Army regulations. Gov't C.A. App. 3-4 (Complaint). He sought an order correcting his record to reflect a promotion to warrant officer in 1952, and an award of back pay retroactive to that date, including increased retirement pay. *Id.* at 5; Pet. App. D3-D4. After the government's jurisdictional challenge,[2] petitioner waived any claim to money damages in excess of $10,000 in order to preserve jurisdiction in the district court. Pet. App. D7;

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[2] See Gov't C.A. App. 19 in *Pacyna* v. *Marsh*, No. 84-6200 (2d Cir.) (Mem. in Supp. of Gov't Mot. to Dis.).

see 28 U.S.C. 1346(a)(2) (granting the district courts jurisdiction, concurrent with the Claims Court, of non-tort claims against the United States "not exceeding $10,000 in amount").

The district court granted the government's motion for summary judgment and dismissed petitioner's complaint. Pet. App. D1-D7. It held that petitioner's claim had accrued, at the latest, upon his retirement from the Army in 1962, and hence that his claim was barred by 28 U.S.C. 2401(a), which establishes a six-year statute of limitations for civil actions against the United States. Pet. App. D4-D7. The court rejected petitioner's argument that his money claim had been "revived" by the ABCMR's 1982 decision, pointing out that acceptance of this argument "would permit a plaintiff * * * to avoid the jurisdictional bar every time he submitted an application which was considered by the Board." Pet. App. D6. The court emphasized that petitioner was not seeking "to correct a discharge from dishonorable to honorable," "to expunge the judgment of a court martial," or to obtain similar relief, but rather was seeking money damages. "[I]n cases like the present one where the relief sought is money," the court concluded, "the statute of limitations is a bar if the case is untimely filed." Pet. App. D5-D6.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed in an unpublished judgment order, and petitioner filed a petition for a writ of certiorari. In our opposition to that petition (No. 84-1706), we acknowledged that there was a jurisdictional defect in the decision below. Specifically, we noted that petitioner's complaint sought money damages and relied upon the district court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1346; that the district court had expressly found jurisdiction under that section; and that petitioner therefore should have appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, not the

Second Circuit. Gov't Br. in Opp. 4-5 in *Pacyna* v. *Marsh*, No. 84-1706; see 28 U.S.C. 1295(a)(2) (Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over an appeal from a final decision of a United States District Court if that court's jurisdiction was based, in whole or part, on 28 U.S.C. 1346). We suggested that the jurisdictional defect was not of sufficient importance to justify the exercise of this Court's discretionary authority to vacate the judgment of the court of appeals and order the court of appeals to transfer the case to the Federal Circuit. 84-1706 Gov't Br. 5. However, this Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case to the court of appeals "to transfer the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631 to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(2)." *Pacyna* v. *Marsh*, 474 U.S. 1078 (1986).

The Federal Circuit unanimously affirmed the district court in an unpublished per curiam opinion. Gov't C.A. App. 7-8. It held that petitioner's claim had accrued in 1952 when he was denied appointment as a warrant officer and that his complaint was therefore barred by the six-year statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. 2401(a). Gov't C.A. App. 7-8. The court further held that resort to review before the ABCMR does not revive a claim for money damages on which the limitations period had already run. Gov't C.A. App. 8.

Petitioner again filed a petition for a writ of certiorari. This Court denied the writ, and petitioner's subsequent request for rehearing. *Pacyna* v. *Marsh*, 481 U.S. 1048 (1987); *Pacyna* v. *Marsh*, 483 U.S. 1034 (1987).

Thereafter, petitioner filed an action in the United States Claims Court. That action was later voluntarily dismissed without prejudice. *Pacyna* v. *United States*, No. 413-87C (Cl. Ct. Nov. 9, 1987).

Subsequently, petitioner filed yet another action in the United States District Court for the Western District of New York. This time the defendants named in the complaint were respondents John O. Marsh, Jr., and John W. Matthews, in their official capacities as Secretary of the Army and Executive Secretary of the Board, and the Army Board for the Correction of Military Records. Petitioner asserted jurisdiction under 5 U.S.C. 702, 10 U.S.C. 1552, and 28 U.S.C. 1361, and also asserted that "[t]he § 702 claim has had no prior court review." Gov't C.A. App. 10.

The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice on the ground that petitioner's claim was barred by *res judicata*. Pet. App. C1-C7. It found that "[t]he factual allegations in both complaints are virtually identical; it appears that the plaintiff copied the instant complaint from the previous one which had been prepared by an attorney. The only distinctions are the way the claim for relief is phrased and the addition of another defendant." Pet. App. C4-C5. "These distinctions," said the court, "do not change the fact that the plaintiff is again attempting to get judicial review of the same old decision by the United States Army." Pet. App. C5.

The court of appeals affirmed "substantially for the reasons stated" by the district court. Pet. App. A2. Petitioner filed a petition for rehearing with suggestion of rehearing en banc, which was denied. Pet. App. B1-B2.

ARGUMENT

1. In this, his third petition for a writ of certiorari, petitioner argues for the first time that in his original action, the district court lacked jurisdiction of his claim and, therefore, that that court's decision and all subsequent decisions rendered by any court in his cases should be vacated.

Specifically, petitioner claims that the district court did not have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1346 because (1) his promotion claim was in effect a contract claim but there was no express or implied contract between himself and the government (Pet. 7-8); (2) his claim for back and retirement pay was in effect a pension claim but Section 1346 does not grant district courts jurisdiction over claims regarding pensions (Pet. 8); and (3) no court has the power to order that former servicemembers be promoted (Pet. 9-11).

Petitioner's jurisdictional arguments are barred by the doctrine of *res judicata*. It is well settled that " '[t]he principles of *res judicata* apply to questions of [subject matter] jurisdiction as well as to other issues.' " *Underwriters Nat'l Assurance Co.* v. *North Carolina Guaranty Ass'n*, 455 U.S. 691, 706 (1982) (quoting *American Surety Co.* v. *Baldwin*, 287 U.S. 156, 166 (1932)); see also *Insurance Corp.* v. *Compagnie des Bauxites*, 456 U.S. 694, 702 n.9 (1982); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 12 (1982); 18 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, *Federal Practice and Procedure* § 4428 (1981 & Supp. 1989). As this Court explained in *Stoll* v. *Gottlieb*, 305 U.S. 165, 172 (1938), "[i]t is just as important that there should be a place to end as there should be a place to begin litigation. After a party has his day in court, with opportunity to present his evidence and his view of the law, a collateral attack upon the decision as to jurisdiction there rendered merely retries the issue previously determined."

Clearly, the issue of subject matter jurisdiction was litigated in petitioner's first lawsuit. Petitioner invoked jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1346 in the district court. Respondent Marsh challenged that jurisdictional basis in his motion to dismiss; petitioner defended his reliance on Section 1346 in his opposition to the motion; and the district court then expressly determined that it had jurisdiction

under that provision. See Pet. App. D6-D7. After this Court ordered the case transferred to the Federal Circuit, that court affirmed the district court's judgment, thereby implicitly upholding that court's jurisdiction based on Section 1346. This Court's subsequent denial of review then rendered the matter *res judicata*. Petitioner cannot now raise his jurisdictional argument.

2. The courts below properly found that petitioner's present claim is barred by *res judicata*. In petitioner's first lawsuit, the district court determined that his challenge to the Army's 1952 decision not to promote him to warrant officer was barred by the statute of limitations. That decision is a judgment "on the merits" for *res judicata* purposes.[3] *Rose* v. *Town of Harwich*, 778 F.2d 77, 80 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159 (1986); *PRC Harris, Inc.* v. *Boeing Co.*, 700 F.2d 894, 896 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 936 (1983); *Ellingson* v. *Burlington Northern, Inc.*, 653 F.2d 1327, 1330 n.3 (9th Cir. 1981); *Nathan* v. *Rowan*, 651 F.2d 1223, 1226 (6th Cir. 1981); *Mathis* v. *Laird*, 457 F.2d 926, 927 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 871 (1972).

The court also explicitly rejected petitioner's claim that he could escape the limitations bar for what was, essentially, a claim for money damages, by obtaining review of his records before the ABCMR in 1981 and then challenging the result of that review. Pet. App. D6-D7. As petitioner himself asserted in his second petition for certiorari

[3] For the reasons stated in our previous oppositions, the district court's decision was also correct. See generally Gov't Br. in Opp. 5-8 in *Pacyna* v. *Marsh*, No. 84-1706; 86-1136 Gov't Br. 5-8; see also 84-1706 Gov't Br. 8 n.6, and 86-1136 Gov't Br. 8 (rejecting petitioner's reliance on cases cited in previous petitions including, *e.g.*, *Hamlin* v. *United States*, 391 F.2d 941 (Ct. Cl. 1968); *Yagjian* v. *Marsh*, 571 F. Supp. 698 (D.N.H. 1983); *Kaiser* v. *Secretary of Navy*, 525 F. Supp. 1226 (D. Colo. 1981); *Mulvaney* v. *Stetson*, 470 F. Supp. 725 (N.D. Ill. 1979), cited by petitioner presently at Pet. 30).

(86-1136 Pet. 16-17, 24-25), he intended to raise a claim under 5 U.S.C. 702 in the first suit, and pressed that claim on appeal in that case and in his petition for certiorari (see 86-1136 Pet. 26-27). The court of appeals expressly affirmed the district court's holding. Gov't C.A. App. 8. This Court then reviewed and rejected petitioner's contention that the existence of his Section 702 claim affected the statutory bar posed by 28 U.S.C. 2401(a). For the reasons detailed in our opposition to the second petition (see 86-1136 Gov't Br. 8-10), that decision was correct; the doctrine of *res judicata* properly bars its reopening at this date.[4]

In any case, although petitioner now purports to be challenging solely the military board's refusal to correct his records, it is clear that he is, at bottom, still contesting the denial of promotion that occurred 37 years ago. See Pet. 35 (suggesting that this Court should remand the case to the Army Board for the Correction of Military Records because "the case is permeated with prevalent court tainted and government irresponsible actions since 1983 and Army violations of its own regulations since 1952").[5] The

---

[4] Petitioner's citations to cases concerning, inter alia, claim-splitting and exhaustion of remedies (Pet. 30-32) are therefore, at this point, inapposite.

[5] Thus, in his complaint in this action, petitioner requested, inter alia,

> That the case be remanded to the Army Board for Correction of Military Records, and that the Defendants be directed to correct CLEMENT J. PACYNA'S military records, pursuant to Army Regulation 15-185 to reflect appointment as Warrant Officer in Counterintelligence Warrant Career, or as amended, in minimum grade W-1 (junior grade) initially from date of denial on January 22, 1952, and because of his exemplary service record and suffering caused him in this matter he be considered in maximum grade W-4 (chief) or an appropriate grade (W-2 or W-3 (chief)) which

purpose of *res judicata*—to "relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on adjudication" (*Allen* v. *McCurry*, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980))—was fully served by its application in this case.

3. Petitioner's claim (Pet. 8) that he was denied due process because the original district court—in a suit brought in that court by petitioner himself—entered a judgment against him without subject matter jurisdiction, is also meritless. "A fundamental requirement of due process is the 'opportunity to be heard' * * * at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." *Armstrong* v. *Manzo*, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965). Petitioner has now litigated his 37-year-old claim in whole or in part before seven different courts. Surely, petitioner has been afforded all the process that is due.

4. A final fact counseling against a grant of certiorari in this case is the insubstantial nature of petitioner's underlying claim. He has not articulated any reason why he was entitled to a promotion in 1952 despite his lack of educational qualifications for the position of warrant officer. As the Board concluded, petitioner has not explained "why the action not to appoint him was illegal or in violation of regulations." Pet. App. D3. And, as was true in 1982, *a fortiori* in 1989, "[b]ecause of [petitioner's long]

> he would have been entitled to as a warrant officer upon his retirement in 1962, had he been appointed warrant officer while he was in the service.

Gov't C.A. App. 13-14. In his first lawsuit, petitioner requested similar relief. Specifically, he prayed that

> Plaintiff's Application for Appointment for Warrant Officer be ordered granted, and that the Defendant be directed to make payments of retirement pay, including back payments from the date Plaintiff's application was initially denied, at a rate commensurate with the retired rank of Warrant Officer."

Gov't C.A. App. 5.

* * * delay in challenging the decision made in 1952, only limited documentation is [now] available." *Ibid.* Thus, whatever action this Court were to take on the petition now before it, the end result of this litigation would be the same.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

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No. 88-2026

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1988

CLEMENT J. PACYNA, PETITIONER
MSG, U.S. Army, Retired

vs.

JOHN O. MARSH, JR., in his capacity as Secretary of the Army, Army Board for Correction of Military Records, and JOHN W. MATTHEWS, in his capacity as Executive Secretary of the Board

---

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER IN REPLY

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1988

No. 88-2620

CLEMENT J. PACYNA, Petitioner,

vs.

JOHN O. MARSH, JR., SECRETARY OF THE ARMY, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER IN REPLY

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals (Pet. App. A) and the opinion of the district court (Pet. App. C) are unreported.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on 10 February, 1989. The timely petition for rehearing, with suggestion for en banc rehearing, was denied on 13 April, 1989 (Pet. App. B). The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under

28 U.S.C. §1254(1).

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

The irresponsible action of the government evident in the petitioner's brief plus its exaggerated or misrepresentative argument and cases cited in its brief, are indicative to petitioner of is continued careless effort and attempt to induce this Court to continue to break the law to rule in its favor not only against a statutory issue but on a promotion issue intended only for Congress, the executive branch, or President (Pet. Brief, Points III & V).

REBUTTAL

1. The government's first argument (pg. 7) that petitioner claimed that "his promotion claim was in effect a contract claim", is simply erroneous. When in fact no such claim was made by petitioner because he claimed that he cannot benefit from a position to which he was not appointed (Pet. Brief, Point V). Therefore, the

court at the outset, clearly lacked subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1346. Significantly, the government from the very outset "vigorously urged that the court does not have jurisdiction under any theory" (Pet. Brief, Point VII and Pet. App. D6, opinion of the first district court or Judge Curtin).

2. The government next argued (pg. 8) that the Courts below properly found that petitioner's present claim is barred by res judicata, which is further simply erroneous. As petitioner's first lawsuit on a claim for a position not had by him in 1952, aforementioned, was outside the scope of the court under §1346 (Pet. Brief, Point VI), the court could not legally bar suit by the statute of limitations, but could only dismiss for lack of jurisdiction (Pet. Brief, pg. 24, par. 1, pg. 30, par 5).

3. The government's next argument (pg. 10) that petitioner claimed that he was

denied due process on a claim in 1952, is furthermore simply erroneous. Correctly, petitioner's claim is that he was denied due process on a timely filed claim accrued in 1982 for review of agency action, rendered arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law, conferred by statute 5 U.S.C. §702, 10 U.S.C. §1552 and 28 U.S.C. §1361 (Pet. Brief, pg. 25, par. 2, pg. 27, par. 3 and pg. 29, par. 4). The claim has not been litigated to date (Pet. Brief, pg. 25, par. 2, pg. 27, par. 3).

4. The government's final argument (pg. 10) that a fact concisely against a grant of certiorari in this case is the unsubstantiated nature of petitioner's underlying claim that he has not articulated any reason why he was entitled to a promotion and that as the government concluded that petitioner has not explained "why the action to appoint him was illegal or in violation of regulations", is furthermore

simply erroneous. First, the prevalent Army violations, which the government or board had before it, and which are clearly proven/documented on the face of the record (Pet. Brief, pg. 14, par. 5 and pg. 15, par. 6). SECOND, case law holds that the plaintiff would not be required to prove that for the Army's violations of its own regulations he would or probably would have been appointed. Sanders v. U.S., 594 F.2d 804, 1979. (Pet. Brief to court of appeals, pg. 16, par. 2e).

CONCLUSION

The government's argument should be denied and the petitioner's writ of certiorari should be granted, in the interest of substantial justice.

Respectfully submitted.

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19 August, 1989

Supreme Court, U.S.
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BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether military veterans should be denied judicial review when seeking only equitable relief for Constitutional, statutory, or regulatory violations committed by their superior officers?

2. Did the district court and the court of appeals apply the correct standard of review to petitioner's within claim in light of intervening circumstances of substantial or controlling effect of this case?

CERTIFICATION

Petitioner certifies that the within petition for rehearing is presented in good faith and not for delay.

S/ Clement J. Pacyna
CLEMENT J. PACYNA

PROTEST REGISTERED

Petitioner most vigorously protests that the District Court, Western District of New York created or restructured jurisdiction to satisfy its or the government's idea, affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, causing to bar this military veteran's legal claim. They have acted beyond their authority, and of The Congress, President, or an Executive Department, in violation of Constitutional and statutory provisions.

This has resulted in substantial prejudice to petitioner, affecting millions of veterans, which this Court ought to look into relative to this application.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Questions Presented..... i

Certification..... ii

Protest Registered..... ii

Opinions below..... 1

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved..... 2

Statement..... 3

Argument..... 13

Conclusion..... 28

Appendices:

Order/Judgment, Court of Appeals... A
Order/Judgment, Rehearing denied... B
Opinion, Second district court..... C
Opinion, First district court..... D
Order, U.S. Supreme Court 10/2/89.. E
Letter, Army notification 1/22/52.. F
ABCMR, final decision 7/20/82..... G

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967).....22

Air Transport Assn. v. PATCO, 516 F. Supp. 1108, Affirm 667 F.2d 316....24

Ashe v. McNamara, 355 F.2d 277 (CA 1st Cir., 1965).....21

Page

Austin v. United States, 393 F. Supp. 291..... 22

Blevins v. Orr, 721 F.2d 1419 (D.C. Cir., 1983)..... 25

Dilley v. Alexander, 603 F.2d 914 (D.C. Cir., 1979)..... 25

Dore v. Kleppe, 522 F.2d 1369 (CA 5th Cir., 1976)..... 24

Ganse v. United States, 180 Ct. Cl. 183, 376 F.2d 1354 (1974)..... 17

Goldstone v. Payne, 94 F.2d 855 (CA 2d Cir., 1938)..... 19

Hall v. Fry, 509 F.2d 1105..... 22

Hamlin v. United States, 391 F.2d 941 (Ct. Cl., 1968)..... 21

Hardison v. Alexander, 655 F.2d 1281 (D.C. Cir., 1981)..... 25

International Harvester v. OSHAC, 628 F.2d 982 (CA 7th Cir., 1980)... 24

Kaiser v. Sec. of Navy and Board for Correction of Naval Records, 525 F. Supp. 1226..... 21

Mason v. Hitchcock et al, 108 F.2d 134 (CA 1st Cir., 1939)..... 19

Mulvaney v. Stetson, 470 F.Supp 725.. 21

Nolen v.Schlesinger, Sec. of Defense, 492 F.2d 787 (CA 5th Cir.)..... 21

Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 90 (1953)..... 18

Page

Pacyna v. Marsh, 617 F. Supp. 101 (W.D.N.Y., 1984).....10,12

Pacyna v. Marsh, 809 F.2d 792 (CA Fed. Cir., 1986)..... 10

Pacyna v. Marsh, 107 S. Ct. 3278 (1987)..... 11

Ruddies v. Auburn, 261 F. Supp. 648.. 24

Rusk v. Cort, 309 U.S. 367, 379-380.. 23

Tucker v. Department of the Army, 447 F. Supp. 1207 (D.C.D.C., 1978) Affirmed 593 F.2d 1372, 193 U.S. App. D.C. 218..... 25

Uhley v. United States, 121 F. Supp. 674..... 21

United States v. McLean, 95 U.S. 750 (1878)..... 17

United States v. Mitchell, 463 L.Ed2d 580..... 19

United States v. Mouat, 124 U.S. 303..... 18

United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 396, 402 (1976)..... 17

Van Drasek v. Lehman, Sec. of Navy, 762 F.2d 1065 (CA D.C. Cir (1985).. 18

Wood et v. Sec. of Defense et al, 496 F. Supp. 192 (1980)..... 21

Yagjian v. Marsh, Sec of Army, 571 F. Supp. 698..... 21

Page

Yee v. United States, 512 F.2d 1383 (Ct. Cl., 1975)..... 22

Statutes:

5 U.S.C. §702.....Passim
10 U.S.C. §1552.....Passim
28 U.S.C. §1254(1)..... 2
28 U.S.C. §1346.....Passim
28 U.S.C. §1361.....Passim
28 U.S.C. §1631..... 2
28 U.S.C. §2401(a).....10,26

Other Authorities:

Army Regulation (AR) 15-185..... 5
Army Regulation (AR) 600-148..... 6,7
Army Regulation (AR) 610-15..... 6
Constitution of the United States, Amendments V and XIV.....Passim

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1988

No. 88-2026

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v.

JOHN O. MARSH, JR., Secretary of the Army, et al.

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER

OPINIONS BELOW

The Order/Judgment of the Court of Appeals (App. A) and the Memorandum/Order of the district court (App. C) are not reported.

JURISDICTION

The Judgment of the court of appeals was entered on 10 February, 1989. The petition for rehearing, with suggestion for rehearing en banc, was denied on

13 April, 1989 (App. B). The order of this U.S. Supreme Court denying petition for a writ of certiorari was entered on 2 October, 1989 (App. E). The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. §1254(1) and Rule 51 of this Court.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

1. CONSTITUTION, Amend V provides:

   No person shall be denied due process of law.

2. CONSTITUTION, Amend XIV provides:

   No person shall be denied equal protection of law.

3. 5 U.S.C. §702 provides:

   For "Right of Review" of an agency action on a non monetary claim, where its decision is wrong.

4. 10 U.S.C. §1552 provides:

   District Courts jurisdiction to review adverse decision by board for correction of military records which is made arbitrarily, capriciously or contrary to law.

5. 28 U.S.C. §1346(a)(2) provides:

   The district courts shall have jurisdiction in any civil action or

> claim against the United States, not exceeding $10,000 in amount, founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department or upon any express or implied contract with the United States.
>
> §1346(d) provides:
>
> That the district court shall not have jurisdiction under this section of any civil action or claim for a pension.

6. 28 U.S.C. §1361 provides:

> District courts jurisdiction for actions in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer of the United States...to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.

7. 28 U.S.C. 1631 provides:

> Transfer to cure want of jurisdiction in the interest of justice.

STATEMENT

1. Petitioner is an Army master sergeant (pay grade E-7) who retired from active duty in 1962 after completing over 20 years of "outstanding" active military service, both in combat and as a counter-intelligence agent (66-72).[1/]

1. Indicates page(s) of appendix to petitioner's brief to the court of appeals.

2. In August 1951, while a master sergeant and serving as a counter-intelligence agent in the Army, petitioner applied for a promotion to the position of warrant officer in the Counter-intelligence Corps (CIC). His immediate superiors as well as a board of review officers, first Army commanding general and the Army's surgeon general highly approved his appointment and physical qualifications, respectively (57-59).[1/]

3. In a letter, dated 22 January 1952, petitioner was notified through Army channels that he had been selected for appointment by his First Army Headquarters and that his application was forwaded to The Adjutant General (TAG) in accordance with current directives. However, TAG informed that headquarters that petitioner's appointment was not favorably considered.

Significantly the letter or notification, the only document in petitioner's

possession prior to 1979 relative to the matter, failed to contain the reason(s) for the disapproval (App. F), required by Army regulations, infra.

4. Immediately thereafter upon the denial in 1952, attempts to obtain the reason(s) for disapproval met with the Army's directive "you don't question higher authority" (56).[1/]

5. On 13 June 1980 petitioner filed an application accompanied by 31 enclosures containing substantial proof of evidence on the face of the record with the Army Board for Correction of Military Records (ABCMR), seeking reversal of the prior determination, which denied him advancement to warrant officer status, back pay, etc., pursuant to Army Regulation (AR) 15-185 (29-38)[1/] and under the provisions to recover on disability created by statute under 10 USC 1552(a) and (b). §1552 provides for correction

of military records from error or removal of an injustice, in the interest of substantial justice.

6. Petitioner's grievance, supported by substantial evidence, to the ABCMR was based on the Army's prevalent violations of its own regulations AR 600-148 (47-54)[1/] supplementing AR 610-15 (39-46),[1/] and due process rights, briefly as follows:

a. In failing to notify petitioner of the reason(s) for disapproval of his appointment (App. F), supra, the Army was in violation of AR 600-148, Section II, par. 72 and Section III, par. 9e, requiring reason(s) for disappproval.

b. In denying petitioner's request for the reason(s) for disapproval, the Army was in violation of Constitutional rights, Amend. V and XIV, requiring due process of law.

c. In violation of AR 600-148, Section II par. 5b(2), petitioner's appli-

cation when ruled upon by CIC and TAG contained neither the required request for educational waiver, with prerequisites, nor his immediate commander's comment recommending approval or disapproval with the reasons therefore. The application was complete when initialed filed and forwarded by First Army Headquarters to TAG, supra. The Army reported, indicating that the Waiver and Comment are the only documents not a matter of record (61-62).[1/]

d. In failing to return the incomplete application to petitioner, the Army was in violation of AR 600-148, Section II par. 7d, which required return of incomplete applications for completion in compliance with its provisions.

7. Notwithstanding the substantial and controlling evidence on the face of the record, supra, the ABCMR denied petitioner's application (73-74),[1/] request for reconsideration (75-82)[1/] and vigorous

appeal to the Secretary of the Army, infra.

Ironically, the ABCMR's final decision on 20 July 1982 in part states substantially: that your vigorous dissent has been noted; that there is no material error or injustice in the Department's denial of Sergeant Pacyna's application for appointment as a warrant officer in 1952; that the denial constituted final agency action; that petitioner was not barred from asking for reconsideration upon discovery of additional substantive evidence; and that petitioner has the right to institute action in a Federal Court (App. G).

8. Siginificantly, the ABCMR in a communication, dated 3 October 1980 addressed to The Judge Advocate General (TGAG), requested that appropriate corrective administrative action be taken upon a finding of legal deficiency in the Department's denial of plaintiff's application for

appointment of warrant officer in 1952 (28).[1/] Despite the record it had reviewed, inclusive of the violations and regulations had before it, supra, TJAG reported "no legal error was found"(84).[1/]

FIRST COURT ACTION

9. On 23 February 1983, petitioner filed suit against respondent John O. Marsh, Jr. in the United States District Court for the Western District of New York. He sought an order appointing him to warrant officer, award of back pay to 1952 and increase in his retirement pension and review of the ABCMR'S final decision in 1982. He alleged that the district court's jurisdiction on the appointment, back pay and pension was based on the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346, and review of the ABCMR'S final denial in 1982 was based on the mandamus statute, 28 USC 1361 and 10 USC 1552. He alleged that the ABCMR'S final decision was arbitrary,

capricious or contrary to law.

10. In his opinion of March 7, 1984 Judge Curtin concluded that Plaintiff's claims accrued in 1952, at the latest, 1962, and therefore were time barred under 28 USC 2401(a). He held that although the government vigorously urges that the court does not have jurisdiction under any theory, he found that there was justification under §1346. Plaintiff had waived his claim to the monetary award over $10,000.00 (App. D).

11. Judge Curtin granted the government's motion for summary judgment and dismissed petitioner's complaint. Pacyna v. Marsh, No. Civ-83-205C, 617 F. Supp. 101 (W.D.N.Y., 1984).

12. The court of appeals for the federal circuit affirmed the decision. Pacyna v. Marsh, No. 86-1488, 809 F.2d 792 (1986).

13. Petitioner's petition for a writ of certiorari was denied by the U.S.

Supreme Court. Pacyna v. Marsh, No. 86-1136, 107 S.Ct. 3278 (1987).

SECOND COURT ACTION

14. On 10 December 1987, petitioner commenced the instant suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of New York.

15. The instant suit soley sought judicial review of the ABCMR'S final decision on 20 July 1982 on a non monetary claim for alleged agency wrong, pursuant to "Right of Review" conferred by statute 5 USC 702, the mandamus statute 28 USC 1361, and 10 USC 1552, supra.

16. Petitioner's ground for the suit was predicated on "Right of Review" of a wrong committed by the agency's or ABCMR"S final decision accrued in 1982, not 1952 or at the latest 1962 alleged by the prior court and agreed upon by the second court, and therefore it was not subject to the statute of limitations. Also, that al-

though the claim had been presented in the prior action it was not litigated.

17. In his opinion of 14 August 1988, Judge Elfvin specifically stated in part that a similar, if not identical, complaint was dismissed by John T. Curtin of this United States District Court on grounds that it was barred by the applicable six years statute of limitations for actions against the United States. Pacyna v. Marsh, 617 F. Supp. 101 (W.D. N.Y., 1984), supra. That the defendants now move to dismiss the Complaint on the grounds of the applicable statute of limitations, res judicata and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Judge Elfvin concluded that the claim was barred by res judicata. Accordingly he Ordered that the defendants' motion to dismiss the Complaint is granted and the Complaint is dismissed with prejudice (App. C).

18. The court of appeals for the second

circuit affirmed the decision. Pacyna v. Marsh, et al, No. 88-6230 on 10 February 1989 (App. A). Petitioner in his appeal for rehearing, with suggestion for en banc hearing, sought relief for the first time from a fatal jurisdictional defect existing in the prior proceedings hereto had herein. His petition for rehearing en banc was denied on 13 April 1989(App.B).

19. The basis for federal jurisdiction in the district court is found in 5 USC 702, 10 USC 1552 and 28 USC 1361.

ARGUMENT

PETITIONER SHOULD NOT BE DENIED JUDICIAL REVIEW OR BE BARRED BY RES JUDICATA WHEN SEEKING ONLY EQUITABLE RELIEF FOR CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY, OR REGULATORY VIOLATIONS COMMITTED BY HIS SUPERIOR OFFICERS, WHEN: (1) THE SUIT IS TIMELY FILED; (2) THE CLAIM WAS NOT LITIGATED IN THE PRIOR ACTION; (3) THE CLAIM IS CONFERRED BY STATUTE AND NO STATUTE PROHIBITS RELIEF; AND (4) A FATAL JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT EXISTS AT THE OUTSET OF THE LAW SUIT.

Petitioner vigorously contends that this Court seriously erred in denying

his writ of certiorari, having overlooked or misapprehended intervening circumstances of substantial or controlling effect of this unique case, infra.

The second district court or Judge Elfvin's decision barring suit by res judicata, affirmed by the court of appeals is simply seriously erroneous as a matter of law.

Petitioner's instant claim was soley for review of the ABCMR'S final decision in 1982, conferred by statutes, which was not litigated in the prior action, supra, infra. While the first district court or Judge Curtin's decision, which is flawed, infra, barred suit by the six year statute of limitations on a claim primarily seeking an order for appointment and pension accrued in 1952, supra, infra.

Judge Curtin created or restructured jurisdiction to satisfy his or the government's idea, by barring petitioner's suit

for which the court had no jurisdiction under §1346. Significantly, Judge Curtin made no determination on petitioner's equitable claim, whether the ABCMR'S final decision in 1982 was improper or not, for which claim there is jurisdiction and the claim is conferred by statutes, supra, infra.

Judge Curtin substantially ruled, although erroneously, that petitioner could not revive him 1982 claim where the 1952 claim was barred by the statute of limitations, finding that there was jurisdiction under §1346 since plaintiff had waived his claim to any monetary award over $10,000.

Therefore, Judge Curtin seriously erred as a matter of law, causing substantial prejudice and denial of justice to petitioner, for reasons as follows:

1. §1346(a)(2) provides that district courts shall have original jurisdiction

concurrent with the Court of Claims, of:

"Any other civil action or claim against the United States, not exceeding $10,000 in amount, founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States".

Since petitioner sought an order to appoint him, he had no claim founded under the requirements under §1346(a)(2), and therefore he could not benefit from, or sue, or waive the $10,000 in amount, for, a position of warrant officer not had by him, supported by case law, infra.

2. §1346(d) clearly provides that the district courts shall not have jurisdiction under this section of any civil action or claim for a pension.

Therefore, having no power to grant the defendant summary judgment, Judge Curtin was required to dismiss, not bar on the statute of limitations, the monetary claim for lack of jurisdiction under §1346(a)(2)&(d), and was required to li-

tigate the equitable Claim for review of the ABCMR'S action, which he did not do, but for which he had jurisdiction, infra.

Case opinions directly to the point, in this case, respectively, are as follows:

1. The U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 396, 402 (1976), remanded case with directions to dismiss suit, holding:

"The dissent argued that the jurisdiction of the Court ... is limited to money judgments and, since none had been or could be ordered in this case, the court was without jurisdiction". " In addition the respondents had not stated a claim upon which relief could be granted, for they were asking for positions, and pay, to which they had never been appointed. The dissent further argued that there is no constitutional right to a government position to which one has not been appointed; that the salary of a Government job is payable only to the person appointed to that position; and that the court had no authority to take over the appointing power that the Constitution, Art. II, §2, has placed in the Executive Department."

"The established rule is that one is not entitled to the benefit of a position until he has been duly appointed to it. United States v. McLean, 95 U.S. 750 (1878); Ganse v. United States, 180 Ct.

Cl. 183, 186, 376 F.2d 900, 902 (1967)."

2. The U.S. Supreme Court in Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83,90 (1953), held:

"The President commissions all Army officers, 5 U.S.C. §11. We have held that, except one holds his appointment by virtue of a commission from the President, he is not an officer of the Army. United States v. Mouat, 124 U.S. 303. Congress has authorized the President alone to appoint Army officers in grades up to an including that of colonel, above which the advice and consent of the senate is required. 55 Stat. 728, as amended, 57 Stat. 380."

" It is obvious that the commissioning of officers in the Army is a matter of discretion within the province of the President as Commander in Chief. Whatever control courts have exerted over tenure or compensation under an appointment, they have never assumed by any process to control the appointing power either in civilian or military positions."

3. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Van Drasek v. Lehman, 762 F.2d 1065, 1985, held:

"As explained in greater detail below, for a claim in the district court to be based on the Tucker Act, it must (1) seek money (2) not exceeding $10,000 (3) from the United States and (4) be founded either upon a contract or upon a provision of "the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department," 28 U.S.C. §1346(a)(2), that

can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for damages sustained." United States v. Mitchell, 463 L.Ed2d 580 (1983). If any of these requirements are not met, the claims falls outside the scope of the Tucker Act, and this court would retain appellate jurisdiction over the entire case."

4. The Court of Appeals for the 2d Circuit and 5th Circuit in Goldstone v. Payne, 94 F.2d 855 and in Mason v. Hitchcock, et al, 108 F.2d 134, substantially Ordered, respectively:

"The judgment of the District Court is vacated and the case is remanded to that court with direction to dismiss the cause for want of jurisdiction", finding that: Jurisdiction over the subject matter in the district court if not conferred by law cannot be created by the parties", and that "Consent or waiver of the parties, even by appearance in court or going to trial, can never confer jurisdiction upon a federal court."

II —

THE DISTRICT COURT AND COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT APPLY THE CORRECT STANDARD OF REVIEW TO PETITIONER'S EQUITABLE CLAIM AFFORDED VETERANS BY OTHER COURTS, IN LIGHT OF THE INTERVENING CIRCUMSTANCES OF SUBSTANTIAL OR CONTROLLING EFFECT GRAPHICALLY ILLUSTRATED ABOVE & BELOW.

For the reasons aforementioned, the first district court or Judge Curtin's

decision, affirmed by the court of appeals, on a monetary claim, is jurisdictionally defective.

With respect to petitioner's claim for equitable relief, the instant district court and court of appeals' decisions are flawed for two (2) reasons, as follows:

1. The prior district court or Judge Curtin did not litigate petitioner's claim for judicial review seeking only equitable relief for Constitutional, statutory, or regulatory violations committed by his superior officers, even though suit is timely filed and the claim for review of the ABCMR'S final decision accrued in 1982, and the claim is conferred by statute § 702, §1361 and §1552, supra, and there is no statute to preclude review.

The petitioner's claim supported by clear , convincing and substantial evidence on the face of the record herein, is that the ABCMR'S final decision, supra is

arbirary, capricious, or contrary to law, in light of the prevalent Constitutional, statutory, or regulatory violations committed against him by his superior officers, in denying him an appointment to warrant officer in 1952.

The record is absent a ruling by any court whether or not the ABCMR'S final decision in 1982 is or was improper or not.

Petitioner's claim is supported by numerous case authorities, which hold, in the interest of justice, that veterans cause of action for judicial review or corrective relief accrued at the date of the military correction board's final decision (1982), not the date of the alleged error or injustice occurred at time of service. 2/

2. See: Uhley v. United States, 121 F. Supp.674; Yagjian v. Marsh, 571 F.Supp. 698; Kaiser v. Sec. of Navy and Board for Correction of Military Records, 525 F. Supp. 1226; Mulvaney v. Stetson, 470 F. Supp. 725; Ashe v. McNamara, 355 F.2d 277; Nolen v. Schlesinger, 492 F.2d 787; Hamlin v. United States, 391 F.2d 941; and Wood v. Sec. of Defense, 496 F. Supp 192 (1980).

Accordingly, his prior and instant suit filed in 1983 and 1987 on a claim accrued in 1982, occurring within the six years of the filing, respectively, supra, are not barred by the six years statute of limitation.[2/]

As petitioner's case contains Army violations clearly presented on the record, supra, numerous case authorities hold that when a military correction board fails to correct an injustice clearly presented in the records before it, it is acting in violation of its own mandate, and such a violation, contrary to the evidence is arbitrary or capricious.[3/]

A significant case dealing directly to the point in this case, is the U.S. Supreme Court opinion in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140, 141

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3. See: Yee v. United States, 512 F.2d 1383; Hall v. Fry, 509 F.2d 1105 and Austin v. United States, 393 F.Supp. 291.

(1967), which granted certiorari, reversed and remanded, holding:

"the Administrative Procedure Act, which embodies the basic presumption of judicial review to one suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, "5USC §702, so long as no statute precludes such relief or the action is not one committed by law to agency discretion, 5 USC §701(a). The Administrative Procedure Act provides specifically not only for review of "(a)gency action made reviewable by statute" but also for review of a "final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court, "5 USC §704."

"Again in Rusk v. Cort, 309 U.S. 367, 379-380, the Court held that only upon a showing of "clear and convincing evidence" of a contrary legislative intent should the courts restrict access to judicial review."

2. In light of the jurisdictional defect on the monetary claim, and the equitable claim was not litigated, in the prior action, the instant district court and the court of appeals affirmation barring suit by res judicata, is legal error and not in keeping with public policy and case authorities with respect to the ap-

plication of res judicata, as follows:

a. As the prior district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction at the outset of the lawsuit, supra, all decrees, judgments, orders, etc., of that court and, for that matter, all appellate decisions in the action are a nullity (Federal Courts Key 542, Judgments Key 16). See Air Transport Assn. v. PATCO, 516 F. Supp. 1108, Affirmed 667 F.2d 316, Ruddies v. Auburn, 261 F. Supp. 648.

b. The Court of Appeals, 5th Circuit, in Dore v. Kleppe, 522 F.2d 1369, which reversed and remanded, held:

> "Key to deciding whether res judicata applies is a determination of whether second suit involves the same cause of action as the prior litigation; if the cause of action is different in the second suit the parties are estopped from relitigating only those issues actually and necessarily decided in the first suit. Res judicata is a principle of public policy and should be applied as to give rather than deny justice."

c. The CA 7th Cir., 1980, in International Harvester v. OSHRC, 628 F.2d 982,

which reversed and remanded, held:

"Action against company ... was not barred by res judicata, since in both prior actions ... the issue was not litigated or decided on its merits."

d. Findings, whether military Correction Board acted improper or not, were made in dealing with res judicata in Blevins v. Orr, 721 F.2d 1419 (D.C. Cir., 1983); Tucker v. Department of the Army, 447 F. Supp. 1207, 193 U.S. App. D.C.218; and Hardison v. Alexander, 655 F.2d 1281 (D.C. Cir., 1981)citing Dilley v. Alexander, 603 F.2d 914 (D.C. Cir., 1979).

In Dilley v. Alexander, supra the court reversed, holding:

"As judge MacKinnon speaking for this court in Dilley, concluded:", "It is the duty of the federal courts to inquire whether action of a military agency conforms to the law, or is instead arbitrary, capricious or contrary to the statutes and regulations governing that agency". "It is to this limited but critical inquiry that we now turn."

Petitioner contends that a ruling, where court lacks subject matter jurisdiction at the outset of a lawsuit, such

as happened in this case, is a decision not on the merits for res judicata purposes.

At a minimum this Court should Order:

1. The district Court or Judge Curtin's March 7, 1984 Order/Judgment of dismissal under §1346 barring suit on the monetary claim under §2401(a), vacated on grounds od lack of jurisdiction, and remand the equitable claim for review of the ABCMR'S final decision on July 20, 1982;

2. The court of appeals for the federal circuit's November 13, 1986 Order/Judgment of affirmation, vacated;

3. The district court or Judge Elfvin's August 14, 1988 Order/Judgment, barring suit by res judicata, vacated.

4. The court of appeals for the second circuit's February 10, 1988 Order/Judgment of affirmation, vacated; and or

5. This Court, in connection with the

above, as the appellate Court, should remand this case on the equitable claim to the ABCMR on grounds that its final decision of July 20, 1982 is arbitrary, capricious, contrary to the evidence presented and contrary to law; and

Petitioner prays for such other and further relief as may be just and proper.

From the foregoing it is clear that the appeals courts have so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings and so far sanctioned such departure by the district courts and have decided an important question of Federal law affecting millions of veterans which has not been, but should be, settled by this Court.

It is also clearly evident from the foregoing, that this Court's denial of peti-

tioner's appeal for a writ of certirari (App. E), is arbitrary, capricious and contrary to Constitutional and statutory provisions, and is in conflict with its own opinions and decisions and the decisions of other federal courts on this matter, aforementioned.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons the petition for rehearing for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted.

S/ Clement J. Pacyna
CLEMENT J. PACYNA, pro se
MSG, U.S. Army, Retired
1151 Wehrle Drive
Williamsville, New York 14221
Telephone: (716) 632-4078

Dated: October 18, 1989

APPENDICES

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND CIRCUIT

At a stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the United States Courthouse in the City of New York, on the 10th day of February, one thousand nine hundred and eighty-nine.

Present: Honorable J. Edward Lumbard,
Honorable Amalya L. Kearse,
Honorable Ralph K. Winter,
Circuit Judges.

No. 88-6230

CLEMENT J. PACYNA,
MSG, U.S. Army Retired
Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

JOHN O. MARSH, JR., in his capacity as Secretary of the Army, Army Board for Correction of Military Records, and JOHN W. MATTHEWS, in his capacity as Executive Secretary of the Board,
Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of New York.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of record from the United States

District Court for the Western District of New York, and was submitted by Plaintiff pro se and by counsel for defendants.

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed that the judgment of said District Court be and it hereby affirmed substantially for the reasons stated in the Memorandum and Order of Judge John T. Elfvin dated August 14, 1988.

/s/J. EDWARD LUMBARD
J. Edward Lumbard, U.S.C.J.

/s/AMALYA L. KEARSE
AMALYA L. KEARSE, U.S.C.J.

/s/RALPH K. WINTER
RALPH K. WINTER, U.S.C.J.

Filed FEB 10 1989

N.B. This summary order will not be published in the Federal Reporter and should not be cited or otherwise relied upon in unrelated cases before this or any other court.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND CIRCUIT

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals, in and for the Second Circuit, held at the United States Courthouse, in the City of New York, on the 13th day of April, one thousand nine hundred and eighty-nine. No. 88-6230

FILED April 13, 1989

CLEMENT J. PACYNA,
MSG, U.S. Army retired,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

JOHN O. MARSH, JR., in his capacity as Secretary of the Army, Army Board for Correction of Military Records, and JOHN W. MATTHEWS, in his capacity as Executive Secretary of the Board.

A petition for rehearing containing a suggestion that the action be reheard in banc having been filed herein by plaintiff-appellant, CLEMENT J. PACYNA, pro se.

Upon consideration by the panel that heard the appeal, it is ORDERED that said petition for rehearing is denied.

It is further noted that the suggestion

for rehearing in banc has been transmitted to the judges of the court in regular active service and to any other judge that heard the appeal and that no such judge has requested that a vote be taken thereon.

s/ELAINE B. GOLDSMITH
ELAINE B. GOLDSMITH
Clerk

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

CLEMENT J. PACYNA,
MSG, U.S. Army Retired,
Plaintiff,

v.

JOHN O. MARSH, JR., in his capacity as Secretary of the Army, Army Board for Correction of Military Records, and JOHN W. MATHHEWS, in his capacity as Executive Secretary of the Board,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CIV-87-1531E

This is an action seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Army Board for Correction of Military Records ("the Board"). The plaintiff, acting pro se asks this Court to correct his military records to reflect his appointment to Warrant Officer in the United States Army which appointment was denied by the Army in 1952. The defendants now move to dismiss the Complaint on the grounds of the applicable statute of limitations, res judicata and lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

A similar, if not identical, Complaint

was dismissed by Judge John T. Curtin of this United States District Court on the grounds that it was barred by the applicable six-year statute of limitations for action against the United States.[1] Pacyna v. Marsh, 617 F.Supp. 101, 102 (W.D.N.Y., 1984). In that action the plaintiff had named only Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh, Jr. as a defendant and had sought to have his records corrected to reflect his appointment to Warrant Officer and also that his retirement pay be increased to reflect such appointment. Complaint, Pacyna v. Marsh, supra (Civ. No. 83-205C), Exhibit A to Donald P. Simet, Esq. Affidavit (sworn to February 5, 1988). Judge Curtin held that the cause of action had accrued in 1952 when the plaintiff's application for promotion had been denied and

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1. 28 U.S.C. §2401(a) provides that "Every civil action commenced against the United States shall be barred unless the Complaint is filed within six years after the right of action first accrues."

that his action therefore was barred by the six-year statute of limitations.[2]

Judge Curtin was underwhelmed by the plaintiff's contention -- the same contention as is made here -- that the right of action did not accrue until 1982 when his records were denied, and held that the plaintiff could not revive his claim by applying to the Board in 1981 and 1982 and contending that its current adverse decision created anew his cause of action. Pacyna v. Marsh, supra, at 103. Accordingly, the defendant Marsh's motion for summary judgment dismissing the Complaint was granted by Judge Curtin. This decision was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Pacyna v. Marsh, 809 F.2d 792 (1986). cert denied,

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2. Judge Curtin found that, even if the statute of limitations had been tolled while the plaintiff was on active duty pursuant to the Soldiers and Sailor's Civil Relief Act of 1940, 50 U.S.C. App. §501 et seq., his claim would have accrued upon his retirement in 1962. Pacyna v. Marsh, supra, at 102.

___U.S.___, 107 S.Ct. 2177, reh-g denied, ___U.S.___, 107 S.Ct. 3278 (1987); Exhibit D to Simet Affidavit.[3]

The plaintiff maintains that the instant action is not barred by the doctrine of res judicata inasmuch as it is soley an action for review of the new decision by the Board, whereas his earlier action was one for monetary damages. This contention is wholly without merit. Both actions request the same relief -- viz., the correction of his military records to reflect an appointment to the rank of Warrant Officer. The factual allegations in both complaints are vitually identical; it appears that the plaintiff copied the in-

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3. The United States Court of Appeals for Federal Circuit held that the cause of action had accrued in 1952 and that the plaintiff's contention that the Court must review the Board's 1981 and 1982 decisions concerning a matter that accrued 31 years before this action was commenced was contrary to law. Copy of Unpublished Opinion, Pacyna v. Marsh, 809 F.2d 792 (1986) (per curiam), Exhibit D to Simet Affidavit.

stant complaint from the previous one which had been prepared by an attorney. The only distinctions are the way the claim for relief is phrased and the addition of another defendant. These distinctions do not change the fact that the plaintiff is again attempting to get judicial review of the same old decision by the United States Army.

The doctrine of res judicata is well established and its basic principles are familiar. "(A) valid, final judgment on the merits bars a second action by the same plaintiff or his privy against the same defendant or his privy, on the same cause of action***." 1B J. Moore, J.D. Lucas & T. Currier, Moore's Federal Practice 10.411(2), p. 396 (2d ed 1984); see also N.L.R.B. v. United Technologies Corp., 706 F.2d 1254, 1259 (2d Cir. 1983). An earlier judgment precludes subsequent litigation of issues actually decided in the

first action and of issues that could have been raised therein but were not, ibid.; Browning Debenture Holders' Com. v. DASA Corp., 605 F.2d 35,39 (2d Cir. 1978), as long as the two actions arise from the same transaction or series of transactions. See Isaac v. Schwartz, 706 F.2d 15, 17 (1st Cir. 1983).

Minor semantic distinctions can not allow the plaintiff to escape the doctrine of res judicata. The fact that the plaintiff named an additional defendant -- i. e., John W. Matthews -- does not save the Complaint. "There is privity between officers of the same government so that a judgment in a suit between a party and a representative of the United States is res judicata in relitigation of the same issue between that party and another officer of the government." Sunshine Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 402,403 (1940).

The plaintiff asks this Court to allow

him to do that what was earlier held he could not do -- i.e. obtain judicial review of a decision that was made 36 years ago.

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the defendants' motion to dismiss the Complaint is granted and the Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.

Dated: Buffalo, N.Y.
August 14, 1988

/s/ JOHN T. ELFVIN
U.S.D.J.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CIV-83-205C

CLEMENT J. PACYNA,

Plaintiff

v.

JOHN O. MARSH, JR.,
Secretary of the Army,

Defendant.

In this case, plaintiff seeks review of a final decision of the Secretary of the Army. Defendant moves to dismiss on the ground that plaintiff has failed to state a claim and, in the alternative, for summary judgment. The basis for these motions is lack of jurisdiction, statute of limitations, and laches.

The history of this litigation is a long one. It began in 1951, when plaintiff was serving as a master sergeant and applied for an appointment as a warrant officer in the Counter-intelligence Corps (CIC). Although he received approval from his local

commanders, on January 3 (sic), 1952, he was informed that his application did not receive final approval.

Plaintiff continued in military service until 1962, when he retired from the Army with the status of "retired reserve." Nothing occurred after that until February of 1979, when plaintiff made an application through the Freedom of Information Act and examined his personnel file.

On June 13, 1980, plaintiff filed an application with the Army Board for Correction of Military Records (ABCMR), seeking to have his 1952 promotion denial reversed and his records corrected accordingly. Plaintiff claims that his application was timely because it was filed within three years after he discovered the error in his record. In the fall of 1980, the ABCMR solicited and obtained an advisory opinion from the Office of the Judge Advocate General. A copy of the opinion, which re-

commended that plaintiff's claim be denied, was sent to him for his comment. Plaintiff responded in February of 1981.

After considering plaintiff's response, the Board concluded that plaintiff had not given any reason to explain why the action not to appoint him was illegal or in violation of regulations. The Board also held that his failure to timely file his application had made efforts by the Army to investigate his claim difficult. Because of his 28-year delay in challenging the decision made in 1952, only limited documentation is available. This decision was affirmed by the Secretary of the Army on June 7, 1982. Plaintiff's suit followed in February, 1983, with plaintiff claiming that failure to appoint him as a warrant officer was an abuse of discretion and a violation of his rights. He seeks an order of the court appointing him to the rank of warrant officer and retirement pay, including back

payment to the time of the initial denial.

Assuming for the moment that this court has jurisdiction, it is clear that plaintiff's claim is barred by the statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C. §2401(a) provides that a civil suit against the United States must be commenced within six years after the right of action first accrues. The statute may not be waived in actions against the United States. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 (1979). "(A) cause of action is deemed to have accrued when facts exist which enable one party to maintain an action against another." Konecny v. United States, 388 F.2d 59, 65 (8th Cir. 1967), quoting Great American Ins. Co. v. Louis Lesser Enterprises, Inc. 353 F.2d 997, 1001 (8th Cir. 1965).

The file in this case was complete in 1952, when plaintiff's application for promotion was rejected. Plaintiff argues that he was not able to obtain the facts

until he looked at his personnel file through a Freedom of Information Act Procedure in 1979, but there was no reason why he could not have reviewed his personnel records at an earlier date. Even if the statute of limitations was tolled during the period plaintiff remained on active duty, pursuant to the Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act of 1940, 50 U.S. C. App. §501 et seq., his cause of action would have accrued upon his retirement in 1962.

Cases such as Kaiser v. Secretary of the Navy, 525 F.Supp 1226 (D. Col. 1981), cited by Plaintiff in support of his application, do not apply here. The statute of limitations did not apply in Kaiser, because the nature of the relief sought in that case was to correct a discharge from dishonorable to honorable. In that type of case, or cases in which the applicant seeks to expunge the judgment of a court martial,

the statute of limitations is not a bar. However, in cases like the present one where the relief sought is money, the statute of limitations is a bar if the case is untimely filed. In this case, the plaintiff wants his records corrected and, at the same time, he wants the government to increase his retirement pay.

Plaintiff cannot revive his claim by applying to the ABCMR in 1981 and claiming that the 1982 decision revived the jurisdictional statute. To do this would permit a plaintiff to have the power to avoid the jurisdictional bar every time he submitted an application which was considered by the Board. Thus, whether his claim accrued in 1952 or at the time of his retirement in 1962, the time to institute the suit has long passed.

Although the government vigorously urges that the court does not have jurisdiction under any theory, I find that there is

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1346. Plaintiff has waived his claim to any monetary award over $10,000.00.

Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted, and the complaint is dismissed.

So ordered.

/S/ JOHN T. CURTIN
USDJ

Dated: March 7, 1984.

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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20543

October 2, 1989

Mr. Clement J. Pacyna
1151 Wehrle Drive
Williamsville, NY 14221

Re: Clement J. Pacyna v. John O. Marsh, Jr., Secretary of the Army, et al.
No. 88-2026

Dear Mr. Pacyna:

The Court today entered the following order in the above entitled case:

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

Very truly yours,

S/ JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR.
T/ Joseph F. Spaniol, Jr.,
Clerk

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HEADQUARTERS FIRST ARMY
GOVERNORS ISLAND, NEW YORK 4, N.Y.

AHFAG-MP 201 Pacyna,Clement J. 22 JAN 1952

SUBJECT: Temporary Appointment as Warrant Officer

THRU: Commanding Officer
108th CIC Detachment
Boston Army Base
Boston, Massachusetts

TO: M/Sgt Clement J. Pacyna, RA20275571

1. Your application for temporary appointment as warrant officer was received at this headquarters and you were tentatively selected for appointment. Your application was forwarded to The Adjutant General in accordance with current directives.

2. The Adjutant General has informed this headquarters that your appointment as warrant officer, junior grade, Army of the United States in Counter-intelligence career warrant is not favorably considered.

BY COMMAND OF

LIEUTENANT GENERAL CRITTENBERGER:

/S/JEROME L. BAES
JEROME L. BAES
1st Lieut, AGC
Asst Adj Gen

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310
20 Jul 1982

SFMR

Mr. Timothy R. Lovallo, Esq.
950 Ellicott Square Building
Buffalo, New York 14203

Dear Mr. Lovallo:

This is in reply to your letter of 7 July 1982 to the Deputy Assistant Secretary concerning the case of Master Sergeant Clement J. Pacyna, 106-05-7846, United States Army Retired.

Your vigorous dissent has been noted. However, all evidence currently of record clearly indicates that there was no material error or injustice in the Department's denial of Sergeant Pacyna's application for appointment as a warrant officer in 1952.

Please be advised that within the Department of Defense, the authority to effect the change you seek in Sergeant Pacyna's records can be exercised only through the

Board for Correction of Military Records. Accordingly, there is no higher administrative appeal within the Department of Defense.

Should you discover additional substantive evidence not previously submitted, you may ask for reconsideration of Sergeant Pacyna's case. Otherwise this letter constitutes final agency action on his request for correction of military records. However, if you desire additional review of the Board's actions, then you have the right to institute action in a Federal court of competent jurisdiction.

Sincerely,

/s/JOHN W. MATTHEWS
JOHN W. MATTHEWS
Executive Secretary
Board for Correction
of Military Records